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I. JURIES AND THE LAW
The standard story told about juries and the law is that the legal
instructions jurors receive at the end of the trial are little more than window
dressing—either the jurors simply ignore the instructions or they are
hopelessly confused by the legal guidance the instructions purport to give.1
After all, if law students struggle mightily to learn how to think like lawyers
and attorneys spend a lifetime in practice arguing about how the law should
be interpreted, how can anyone expect to convey complex legal principles
to a lay audience with an abbreviated presentation at the end of a trial? The
classic image is of the jury “being doused with a kettleful of law during the
charge that would make a third-year law student blanch.”2 Yet jury trials
proceed on the implicit assumption that jurors learn the relevant law from

1

E.g., JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 91 (1994); Michael J. Saks, Judicial Nullification,
68 IND. L.J. 1281, 1295 (1993).
2
Skidmore v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 167 F.2d 54, 64 (2d Cir. 1948) (quoting CURTIS BOK, I TOO,
NICODEMUS 261–62 (1946)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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jury instructions.3 Appellate courts follow suit, regularly engaging in a
careful parsing of the specific language used in the instructions the jury has
been given, assuming, or at least behaving as if they assume, that a legally
correct instruction was necessary and sufficient to guide the jury in
producing an acceptable verdict.4 This account of court behavior suggests a
serious commitment to having jurors apply the law.
An alternative view of jury instructions is that the legal system is
ambivalent or even opposed to interfering with juries as they apply their
laypersons’ sense of justice.5 Indeed, as we describe in detail below, some
of the methods and procedures used in drafting and delivering jury
instructions suggest at least a softness in the commitment to instructing
juries on the relevant law.
Mock jury studies and post-trial surveys have long suggested
substantial failures in the instruction process, but they have spurred little
action.6 Until now, however, we have had no direct evidence on what real
juries actually do with the law during their deliberations. The new empirical
research we present here fills this gap and provides a very different image
of juries grappling with the law than the one elicited by mock jury studies
and post-trial surveys. For the first time, the current research provides a
detailed analysis of how jurors discuss the law as they reach their verdicts.
The picture that emerges from the deliberations of fifty real civil juries
reveals that jury instructions both succeed and fail in unexpected ways. The
results suggest that legal jargon is not the primary culprit that threatens
juror comprehension and application of the relevant law. Drawing on this
new evidence, we identify the previously unacknowledged sources that
pose obstacles to the jury’s understanding and application of the law and
suggest approaches to respond to them.
We begin Part II with a brief history of the development of jury
instructions and a review of the empirical work assessing comprehension of
instructions by the modern American jury. In Part III, we describe the
Arizona Jury Project, which enabled us to examine how fifty deliberating
juries in civil trials actually dealt with jury instructions, providing direct
and unique empirical evidence on juror talk about the law during
deliberations. In Part IV, we examine the extent and nature of deliberation
3

See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 243 (1993)
(“[A] reasonable jury is presumed to know and understand the law . . . .”); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S.
62, 73 (1979) (plurality opinion) (“A crucial assumption underlying th[e] system [of trial by jury] is that
juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge.”); Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 313
(7th Cir. 1993) (“[C]ourts invoke a ‘presumption’ that jurors understand and follow their instructions.”).
4
See, e.g., California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 542 (1987) (“We think a reasonable juror
would . . . understand the instruction not to rely on ‘mere sympathy’ as a directive to ignore only the sort
of sympathy that would be totally divorced from the evidence adduced during the penalty phase.”).
5
Saks, supra note 1, at 1289–94.
6
Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Alan Reifman, Juror Comprehension and Public Policy: Perceived
Problems and Proposed Solutions, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 788, 788 (2000).
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talk about jury instructions and assess how accurately that discussion
reflects the legal principles that the jury should apply. While we find
important pockets of misunderstanding, this evidence suggests that
deliberating juries do not exhibit the abysmal failure in understanding the
law that standard comprehension tests show, and that when jurors fail to
apply the law they are given, the slippage is not attributable primarily to
legal jargon. In Part V, we consider how the identified sources of juror
confusion can be addressed by adopting a more holistic (as opposed to
piecemeal) approach to instructing jurors, and by using a more transparent
and collaborative method of communicating with the jurors about the law.
We also identify some deeper problems that clear and comprehensible
instructions probably cannot solve. Finally, in Part VI, we conclude by
comparing the inconsistencies between our picture of how juries respond to
legal instructions and the conventional wisdom as to how juries respond.
We also offer a more radical approach to instructing juries that would
disclose and remedy the lion’s share of most miscommunication with the
jury about the law.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The earliest juries at common law were regarded as equal to the judge
in their ability to interpret the law.7 The rationale was that juries not only
had personal knowledge of the facts but also shared the values of society
and knew the rules of ordinary transactions on which the common law was
built.8 Judges in at least some of the American colonies recognized the right
of the criminal jury to decide matters of law.9 Moreover, judges in early
American courts were often untrained in the law, so they were ill-suited to
offer legal instruction.10 In a study of seventeenth-century civil cases in
Connecticut, historian Bruce Mann found “no indication that judges

7

Harvey S. Perlman, Pattern Jury Instructions: The Application of Social Science Research,
65 NEB. L. REV. 520, 527 (1986); see Arie M. Rubenstein, Verdicts of Consciousness: Nullification and
the Modern Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 959‒60 (2006) (“In the eighteenth century, it was
commonly accepted that a defendant had the right to a jury which both found facts and determined
whether the law should apply. However, by the end of the nineteenth century the jury was reduced to
only a factfinding role . . . .”); see also Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law,
52 HARV. L. REV. 582 (1939) (describing the jury’s acknowledged right to determine both fact and law
in criminal cases in early America and the gradual erosion of that authority).
8
This early view is reflected in the writing of John Adams: “‘The general Rules of Law and
common Regulations of Society, under which ordinary Transactions arrange[d] themselves, . . . [were]
well enough known to ordinary jurors’ . . . .” WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON
LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760–1830, at 26 (1994) (quoting
1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 230 (L. Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel eds., 1965)).
9
Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial
America, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 111, 121–22 (1998).
10
JOHN H. LANGBEIN ET AL., HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLOAMERICAN LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 479 (2009).
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instructed juries on the law to apply.”11 With the development of the
common law and the increased professionalization of the judiciary, legal
instructions from the judge came to play an increasing role as an instrument
of jury control.12 By the end of the nineteenth century, as part of the
increasing efforts at jury control, state legislatures and courts began to
require the trial judge to instruct the jury and empowered the judge to grant
a new trial when the jury’s verdict was held to be inconsistent with the
law.13 In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Sparf & Hansen v. United
States14 that jurors did not have the right to decide questions of law, even in
criminal cases. This decision solidified the importance of jury instructions,
for if jurors did not have the right to decide legal issues, the trial judge had
to give the jury instructions so that the jurors could apply the appropriate
law to the facts they found.
Appellate courts began to review jury instructions, reversing jury
decisions and ordering new trials when judges failed to state the applicable
law accurately.15 Both to increase the likelihood that their instructions
would be accurate and to decrease their chance of being reversed, judges
formed committees, usually with representatives from the practicing bar, to
draft pattern jury instructions that could be endorsed for use in all
applicable cases.16 Most jurisdictions now have some form of pattern jury
instructions,17 and in some states, judges are required to give the pattern jury
instruction whenever applicable instructions are available.18

11

BRUCE H. MANN, NEIGHBORS AND STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT
74 (1987). But see William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth-Century Background of John Marshall’s
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MICH. L. REV. 893, 911–12 (1978) (describing the practice in
Pennsylvania and other states in which judges, albeit sometimes confusingly, charged juries with the law
to be applied).
12
John H. Langbein, Chancellor Kent and the History of Legal Literature, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 547,
566–67 & n.99 (1993).
13
Renée B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in Early NineteenthCentury America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505, 521‒26 (1996).
14
156 U.S. 51, 102 (1895).
15
Cf. Bihn v. United States, 328 U.S. 633, 638 (1946) (finding grounds for reversal when the jury
may have been influenced by an incorrect charge); Eller v. Koehler, 67 N.E. 89, 90 (Ohio 1903)
(holding that incorrect instructions as to the amount of interference plaintiff must show to prove
nuisance constituted reversible error).
16
The first set of pattern jury instructions was developed by a committee of California judges and
lawyers and was published in 1938. See ROBERT G. NIELAND, PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: A
CRITICAL LOOK AT A MODERN MOVEMENT TO IMPROVE THE JURY SYSTEM 7 (1979).
17
Id. at 12. Westlaw has thirty-one states in its directory of pattern jury instructions. See Westlaw
Database Directory, WESTLAW, http://directory.westlaw.com/default.asp?GUID=WDIR00000000000
000000000099223547&RS=W&VR=2.0 (last visited March 21, 2012) (listing thirty-one states); see
also Jan Bissett & Margi Heinen, Reference from Coast to Coast: Jury Instructions Update, LLRX.COM
(July 27, 2007), http://www.llrx.com/columns/reference53.htm (listing six additional states with pattern
jury instructions available on the web); Federal Jury Instructions Resource Page, FED. EVIDENCE REV.,
http://federalevidence.com/evidence-resources/federal-jury-instructions (last visited March 21, 2012)
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As the legal system came to depend on pattern jury instructions to
provide a reference point for trial judges and attorneys, researchers raised
questions about the effectiveness of these instructions in providing adequate
guidance. Since the early 1980s, scholars have accumulated evidence
documenting the failures of jury instructions, demonstrating that laypersons
provided with such instructions perform poorly on comprehension tests,
both in laboratory experiments19 and on post-trial questionnaires
administered to real jurors following their jury service,20 and in a few cases,
revealing inaccurate comprehension of relevant legal concepts despite
jurors’ participation in simulated deliberations.21

(providing hyperlinks to the pattern jury instructions for all federal circuits except the Second and
Fourth Circuits).
18
E.g., ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CIVIL CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CIVIL, intro. at 1 (2011) (quoting Illinois Supreme Court Rule 239, which
provides: “(a) Use of IPI Instructions; Requirements of Other Instructions. Whenever Illinois Pattern
Jury Instructions (IPI) contains an instruction applicable in a civil case, giving due consideration to the
facts and the prevailing law, and the court determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject,
the IPI instruction shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law.”).
19
See, e.g., Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language Understandable: A
Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306, 1316 (1979) (finding that jurors
paraphrasing essential terms in instructions had an accuracy rate of 54%); Amiram Elwork et al.,
Toward Understandable Jury Instructions, 65 JUDICATURE 432, 436 (1982) (finding that accuracy was
51% for a more complex case and 65% for a less complex case); Mona Lynch & Craig Haney,
Discrimination and Instructional Comprehension: Guided Discretion, Racial Bias, and the Death
Penalty, 24 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 337, 347 (2000) (finding that accuracy was 47% for mock jurors in a
capital case); Laurence J. Severance & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Improving the Ability of Jurors to
Comprehend and Apply Criminal Jury Instructions, 17 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 153, 179–80 (1982) (finding
that overall accuracy ranged from approximately 30% to 36% across experimental conditions); Walter
W. Steele, Jr. & Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Jury Instructions: A Persistent Failure to Communicate,
67 N.C. L. REV. 77, 78 (1988) (“[J]urors understood less than half the content of the tested
instructions . . . .”); Richard L. Wiener et al., Comprehensibility of Approved Jury Instructions in
Capital Murder Cases, 80 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 455, 462 (1995) (finding that the upper bound of mock
jurors’ accuracy for key concepts in capital case instructions was rarely above 70%); see also Joel D.
Lieberman & Bruce D. Sales, What Social Science Teaches Us About the Jury Instruction Process,
3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 589 (1997) (reviewing empirical studies of the effectiveness of
instructions).
20
See, e.g., Alan Reifman et al., Real Jurors’ Understanding of the Law in Real Cases, 16 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 539, 548 (1992) (finding that jurors responding to a post-trial survey rarely showed
higher rates of accuracy on legal issues on which they had been instructed than jurors who had not been
instructed on those issues); Bradley Saxton, How Well Do Jurors Understand Jury Instructions? A Field
Test Using Real Juries and Real Trials in Wyoming, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 59, 88 (1998) (finding
that former civil jurors responding to a post-trial questionnaire on instruction comprehension had
accuracy rates of 58%).
21
See, e.g., Mona Lynch & Craig Haney, Capital Jury Deliberation: Effects on Death Sentencing,
Comprehension, and Discrimination, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 481, 486–87 (2009) (finding that mock
jurors had scores of less than 50% correct on a post-deliberation test of instruction comprehension);
Richard L. Wiener et al., Guided Jury Discretion in Capital Murder Cases: The Role of Declarative and
Procedural Knowledge, 10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 516, 555 (2004) (showing essentially no effect
for deliberation in improving juror comprehension scores on tests of instructions); see also Phoebe C.
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Yet this image of jurors befuddled by the law they are asked to apply is
not in complete harmony with some other sources of evidence. First, when
asked, the majority of jurors questioned in post-trial surveys report that they
did not find their legal instructions difficult to understand22 (although some
report they are less convinced that other members of their jury similarly
grasped the relevant law23). Of course, these positive juror reports may well
be wrong, reflecting an overoptimistic self-evaluation. A potentially more
significant indicator is that nearly all studies that have compared jury
verdicts with the verdicts that judges report they would have reached in the
same trial find substantial agreement between the two decisionmakers.24
This agreement certainly could arise not because jurors understand the legal
instructions, but because they share values consistent with the content of
those instructions. Whatever the source of the agreement, it does provide an
indication that problems in communicating legal principles may not pose a
significant threat to the quality of most jury decisionmaking. It is also
possible, as Professor Michael Saks suggests, that judges may produce jury
agreement by influencing juries to agree with them through nonverbal cues
that are likely to be most influential when the evidence and law are not
clear.25 Without a close look at how juries use (or fail to use) legal
instructions during their deliberations, it is hard to evaluate the extent to
which jury misunderstandings about the law play a role in the
decisionmaking process or in final verdicts.
Nonetheless, there is no doubt that jury instructions are hardly the
model of clear communication. Pattern jury instructions are typically
Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 219 (1989) (finding
that 51% of references to instructions during deliberation were correct statements).
22
See, e.g., SEVENTH CIRCUIT BAR ASS’N AM. JURY PROJECT COMM’N, FINAL REPORT 50 (2008),
available at http://www.7thcircuitbar.org/associations/1507/files/7th%20Circuit%20American%20Jury
%20Project%20Final%20Report.pdf; Dennis J. Devine et al., Deliberation Quality: A Preliminary
Examination in Criminal Juries, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 273, 285 (2007) (reporting that 84% of
jurors responded that the law to be applied was clear and understandable after instructions).
23
Shari Seidman Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve
as Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 282, 282–305 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
24
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 58–68 (1966) (78% agreement in
3576 criminal trials and 78% agreement in approximately 4000 civil trials, with hung juries treated as
half agreement, half disagreement); see also Shari Seidman Diamond, Truth, Justice, and the Jury,
26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 150 n.28 (2003) (finding 77% agreement in forty-six civil trials and
74% agreement in forty trials in which liability was contested (citing Shari Seidman Diamond et al.,
Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 (2003)));
Theodore Eisenberg et al., Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven
and Zeisel’s The American Jury, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 171, 181 (2005) (finding 75% agreement
in 290 criminal trials); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its
Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29, 48 (1994) (finding 74% agreement in seventyseven criminal trials and 63% agreement in sixty-seven civil trials). For a review, see Jennifer K.
Robbennolt, Evaluating Juries by Comparison to Judges: A Benchmark for Judging?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 469 (2005).
25
Saks, supra note 1, at 1290.
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written by committees of judges and attorneys who represent opposing
parties (i.e., prosecutors and defense attorneys in criminal cases and
plaintiff and defense attorneys in civil cases). The legal expertise of these
groups appropriately prepares them to produce pattern instructions that can
save the time of lawyers and judges during trial. It also reduces the
likelihood of an appeal or reversal due to an erroneous instruction. Yet legal
accuracy and vetting by multiple legal constituencies do not guarantee that
the instructions will be comprehensible to laypersons. Even achieving legal
accuracy can be a challenge when the law itself is ambiguous. Committees
writing pattern jury instructions have traditionally turned to the wording of
statutes and to case law to decide on the wording of instructions, but have
given little or no attention to communicating meanings to nonlawyers. The
results include instructions like those once given to Illinois juries deciding
on whether or not to impose the death penalty: “If you do not unanimously
find from your consideration of all the evidence that there are no mitigating
factors sufficient to preclude imposition of a death sentence, then you
should sign the verdict requiring the court to impose a sentence other than
death.”26 Although that example includes relatively few words that would
be unfamiliar to laypersons,27 the sentence construction—with its four
negatives—fails to provide a clear description of the weighing standard that
laypersons should apply and displays the tortured construction that can
result when a committee is the author of a communication.28
Recent reform efforts, such as providing preliminary instructions and
supplying jurors with written copies of the instructions, are designed to
assist the jury in understanding and applying the law.29 Although it might
fairly be argued that these reforms are obvious improvements that are long

26

Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1993) (quoting 1987 Illinois Pattern Jury
Instructions).
27
Nonetheless, some informal testing that linguist Judith Levi did with college students suggested
that the word “preclude” is not unambiguous: many of the students thought it meant the opposite of
“conclude.” Judith N. Levi, Evaluating Jury Comprehension of Illinois Capital-Sentencing Instructions,
68 AM. SPEECH 20, 28–29 (1993).
28
This convoluted language was later revised to read: “If after weighing the factors in aggravation
and mitigation one or more jurors determine that death is not the appropriate sentence, then you should
sign the verdict requiring the court to impose a sentence [(other than death) (of natural life
imprisonment)].” 1 ILL. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL
CASES, ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL § 7C.06A (4th ed. 2000 & Supp. 2011) (to
be used in all cases for offenses committed on or after November 13, 2003). It is unclear the extent to
which the revised language produced clarity, but the instruction is now moot in light of the 2011
decision to abolish the death penalty in Illinois.
29
See B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience,
79 JUDICATURE 280, 281–82 (1996); Leonard B. Sand & Steven Alan Reiss, A Report on Seven
Experiments Conducted by District Court Judges in the Second Circuit, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 423, 437–42
(1985); William W. Schwarzer, Reforming Jury Trials, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 129–31; see also
AM. BAR ASS’N, PRINCIPLES FOR JURIES AND JURY TRIALS princ. 6.C.1, at 29 (2005) (endorsing
preliminary instructions, and 14.B, advocating written copies of instructions for each juror).
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overdue, the ability of these aids to offer significant assistance may be
limited unless the instructions themselves are comprehensible.30 As the legal
community has acknowledged, current jury instructions frequently fail to
achieve clarity. Indeed, Principle 14.A of the 2005 American Bar
Association’s Principles for Juries and Jury Trials addresses this issue
explicitly by providing: “All instructions to the jury should be in plain and
understandable language.”31 The commentary recognizes that “jury
instructions remain syntactically convoluted, overly formal and abstract,
and full of legalese” and suggests that communication with the jury often
suffers as a result.32 Nonetheless, despite the fact that sporadic efforts to
improve the comprehensibility of instructions show that substantial
improvements can be made,33 only one jurisdiction has taken on the task of
substantially rewriting its pattern jury instructions in “plain English.”34
The research we present here on real jury deliberations suggests that
the problem of miscommunication may be both overstated and
mischaracterized. That is not to say that jury instructions always provide
clear guidance. Frequently, they do not. In addition, jurors sometimes resist
following legal instructions that they understand. As a whole, however,
communication and jury compliance with the law may be far better than
common wisdom or experimental studies suggest. Moreover, the problems
that do arise often emerge from weaknesses not previously identified:
structural problems and omissions. In some instances, addressing them
would require the legal system to confront questions about the legitimacy of
juror considerations that are inconsistent with legal doctrine and legal
doctrines that are themselves opaque or reflect ambivalent preferences for
how jurors should behave. This new information presents a significant set
of previously unconsidered challenges. Remedies require more dramatic

30

Even these reforms have not been uniformly embraced. For example, the National Center for
State Courts (NCSC) State-of-the-States Survey found that in nearly one out of three jury trials that took
place in the previous year in state courts, the jury did not receive a written copy of the instructions (and
in one of every five federal jury trials, no copy was provided). GREGORY E. MIZE ET AL., THE STATEOF-THE-STATES SURVEY OF JURY IMPROVEMENT EFFORTS: A COMPENDIUM REPORT 32 tbl.24 (2007).
31
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 29, at princ. 14.A, at 107.
32
Id. at princ. 14.A cmt. subdiv. A, at 108.
33
See, e.g., AMIRAM ELWORK ET AL., MAKING JURY INSTRUCTIONS UNDERSTANDABLE 45–49
(1982); Shari Seidman Diamond & Judith N. Levi, Improving Decisions on Death by Revising and
Testing Jury Instructions, 79 JUDICATURE 224, 232 (1996); James Luginbuhl, Comprehension of
Judges’ Instructions in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial: Focus on Mitigating Circumstances,
16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 203, 210–17 (1992) (finding that revising North Carolina’s pattern jury
instructions could substantially improve jury comprehension).
34
California included linguist Peter Tiersma on the pattern jury instructions committee. For
Tiersma’s review of the committee’s approach, the problems it sought to address, and its solutions, see
Peter Tiersma, The Rocky Road to Legal Reform: Improving the Language of Jury Instructions,
66 BROOK. L. REV. 1081 (2001).
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changes than simply reducing the use of legal jargon and tinkering with
awkward sentence construction.35
Courts focusing on simple linguistic translation as the big obstacle to
juror comprehension have tended to resist making changes to the magic
language of statutes and tradition.36 Thus, courts typically respond to
questions from the jury about instructions either by simply rereading the
original language or by telling the jury to look again at the instructions to
determine the relevant law.37 Such passive responses can only be justified if
the court is convinced that clear communication is not possible. Moreover,
“doing no harm” is the most effective way for a trial court to reduce the
likelihood of being reversed for misstating the law.38
As our close study of fifty deliberations reveals, the failure to actively
address the variety of sources leading to miscomprehension of instructions
has consequences: juries may reach decisions that are inconsistent with the
law they are ostensibly being asked to apply. While most verdicts appeared
to be unaffected by problems with the instructions or resistance to a
relevant legal principle, the juries in several instances awarded damages
that were to some degree influenced by instruction errors. Thus, although
our results show far more appropriate application of relevant law than
laboratory jury research would have predicted, they also reveal pockets of
unnecessary miscommunication.
To obtain a better picture of the interaction between juries and the law
that is grounded in what jurors actually do, we now turn to the evidence
from the deliberations of real juries.
III. THE ARIZONA JURY PROJECT
A. The Background of the Project
The Arizona Jury Project, in which we observed actual jury
deliberations,39 presented a unique occasion to observe how juries handle
jury instructions. The opportunity to study these jury deliberations arose
because an innovative group of judges and attorneys in Arizona, appointed
35

We do not underestimate the challenge of writing legally accurate jury instructions that avoid
legal jargon and convoluted sentences. One of us (S.D.), in serving on the Seventh Circuit Criminal
Pattern Jury Instructions Committee, has been impressed by the difficulty in achieving both the accuracy
and clarity of each instruction, despite strenuous efforts to accomplish those goals.
36
Tiersma, supra note 34, at 1084.
37
Ellsworth, supra note 21, at 223–24; Geoffrey P. Kramer & Dorean M. Koenig, Do Jurors
Understand Criminal Jury Instructions? Analyzing the Results of the Michigan Juror Comprehension
Project, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 403 n.14 (1990); Peter M. Tiersma, Jury Instructions in the New
Millennium, CT. REV., Summer 1999, at 28, 31.
38
See Darryl K. Brown, Regulating Decision Effects of Legally Sufficient Jury Instructions, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1105, 1115 (2000).
39
See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Discussions During Civil Trials: Studying an Arizona
Innovation, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 16–22 (2003).
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by the Arizona Supreme Court, examined their judicial system and
proposed changes to their rules in an attempt to optimize jury
performance.40 One such rule was a controversial innovation permitting
jurors to discuss the case among themselves during breaks in the trial.41 To
evaluate the effect of allowing these discussions, the Arizona Supreme
Court issued an order permitting us to conduct an experiment in which
jurors in randomly assigned cases were instructed that they could discuss
the case and those in the control cases were given the traditional admonition
not to discuss the case.42 The court order also permitted us to videotape the
jury discussions and deliberations.43
B. Selection of Jurors and Cases
The jurors, attorneys, and parties were promised that the tapes would
be viewed only by the researchers and only for research purposes. Jurors
were told about the videotaping project when they arrived at court for their
jury service. If they preferred not to participate, they were assigned to cases
not involved in the project. The juror participation rate was more than
95%.44 Attorneys and litigants were less willing to take part in the study.
Some attorneys were generally willing to participate when they had a case
before one of the participating judges; others consistently refused. A case
could be included only if all attorneys and litigants agreed. The result was a
22% yield among otherwise eligible trials.
The fifty cases in the study reflected the usual mix of cases dealt with
by state courts: twenty-six motor vehicle cases (52%), four medical
malpractice cases (8%), seventeen other tort cases (34%), and three contract
cases (6%).45 The forty-seven tort cases in the sample varied from the
common rear-end collision with a claim of soft-tissue injury to cases

40

ARIZ. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES, JURORS: THE POWER OF 12,
at 2–3 (1994).
41
Diamond et al., supra note 39, at 4, 11–14.
42
Id. at 17. In preparing this Article, we tested and found no impact of the opportunity to discuss
the evidence during breaks during the trial on talk about the law.
43
Id. For a detailed report on the permissions and security measures that the project required and
the results of the evaluation, see id. As part of their obligations of confidentiality under the Supreme
Court order, as well as additional assurances to parties and jurors undertaken by the principal
investigators, the authors of this Article have changed certain details to disguise individual cases. The
changes do not, however, affect the substantive nature of the findings that are reported.
44
Id. Although we cannot be certain that the cameras had no effect on their behavior during
deliberations, the behavior during deliberations at times included comments that the jurors presumably
would not have wanted the judges or attorneys to hear.
45
Our case distribution is similar to the breakdown for civil jury trials for the Pima County, Arizona
Superior Court for the year 2001: 62% motor vehicle tort cases, 8% medical malpractice cases, 23%
other tort cases, and 6% contract cases. E-mail from Nicole L. Waters, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, to
authors (Aug. 2, 2004) (on file with authors).
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involving severe and permanent injury or death. Awards ranged from $1000
to $2.8 million, with a median award of $25,500.
C. Data Collection
In addition to videotaping the discussions and deliberations, we also
videotaped the trials themselves and collected the exhibits, juror questions
submitted during trial, jury instructions, and verdict forms. In addition, the
jurors, attorneys, and judge completed questionnaires at the end of the trial.
D. The Data
1. The Trials.—We transcribed the opening and closing arguments in
each case from the trial videotape. We also created a detailed roadmap of
the trial from the videotaped trial. The roadmap described the order in
which testimony occurred, reconstructing in substantial detail what each
witness said and indicating whether the testimony emerged on direct
examination, cross-examination, or redirect. In addition, the roadmap
included any objections from counsel and the outcome of those objections.
The roadmap also included the questions that jurors submitted to the judge
during the trial and the responses that witnesses gave to the juror questions
that the witnesses were permitted to answer.46
2. The Instructions.—We obtained the complete set of instructions
that the court delivered to the jury in each trial. Each juror received a copy
of the final instructions for use during deliberations, consistent with the
practice in Arizona.47 The instructions averaged seventeen pages and varied
in length between thirteen and thirty-three pages. The instructions always
began with the same seven pages of boilerplate instructions (e.g., “What the
attorneys said is not evidence,” “Do not concern yourselves with the
reasons for my rulings on the admission of evidence,” “You should not
speculate or guess about any fact.”).48 An eighth page provided an
instruction on evaluating expert testimony and was included in forty-seven
of the fifty cases—all of the cases in which an expert testified.49 These
boilerplate instructions were followed by a set of case-specific instructions
that varied across trials, depending on the nature of the claims and the
evidence (e.g., what the plaintiff must prove, the life expectancy of
individuals the same age as the plaintiff, the particular categories of
46

Diamond et al., supra note 39, at 19.
See Dann & Logan, supra note 29, at 282.
48
Copies of the instructions are on file with the authors.
49
At the beginning of the trial, the judge delivered a set of boilerplate instructions that were also
included in the final instructions. The preliminary instructions also included: procedural instructions on
note-taking; submitting questions for witnesses during trial; not doing outside research or speaking with
parties, lawyers, or witnesses; and, for cases in which the jurors were permitted to discuss the case
during breaks, instructions on how and when such discussions could occur.
47
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damages to consider if the defendant is found liable, the directive to
compensate only for aggravation of a preexisting condition). In addition to
the instructions, each jury was provided with verdict forms, which provided
supplementary information on the legal requirements of the task (e.g., in a
comparative fault case, space on the verdict form for allocating 100% of
liability across two parties).
Jurors also received instructions on the law from the judge during the
course of the trial, including during deliberations. These instructions
occurred in response to one of two events. The first arose when the judge
responded to a question from the jurors about the law (e.g., “Since the
defendant has admitted negligence in causing the collisions does that mean
we must find in favor of the plaintiff?”) or, more often, when a juror
question asked for information about a topic the jurors were not permitted
to consider (e.g., a question about insurance or whether one of the parties
received a citation after the accident). The second occasion for an
instruction given during the course of the trial arose if one of the attorneys
raised an objection and the judge sustained it. We analyzed all juror talk
during deliberations about instructions received either during the trial,
including during deliberations, or in preliminary or final instructions.
3. Data from the Deliberations.—We created verbatim transcripts of
all deliberations, producing 5276 pages of deliberations transcripts for the
fifty trials. The deliberations consisted of 78,864 comments by the jurors,
each of which was coded on a variety of dimensions, including whether the
comment involved a reference to the instructions. A comment was defined
as a statement or partial statement that continued until the speaker stopped
talking or until another speaker’s statement or partial statement began. If
another speaker interrupted, but the original speaker continued talking, the
continuation was treated as part of the initial comment. For example, here
Juror #2 is in mid-sentence when Juror #4 interrupts to agree before Juror
#2 completes his comment:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #4:
JUROR #2:

Negligence and cause of death . . . [are] also in the fact of what
you don’t do—
I, I agree.
—to prevent it.

In this instance, Juror #2 was credited with one comment and Juror #4 was
credited with one comment.
4. Post-Trial Questionnaires.—At the end of the trial, each juror and
judge completed a questionnaire about the trial. One of the questions asked
them to rate how easy or difficult it was to understand the jury instructions
on a seven-point scale (1 = very difficult to 7 = very easy).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF JURY TALK ABOUT THE LAW DURING DELIBERATIONS
A. Defining Talk About the Instructions
We coded each comment a juror made that referred to one of the
concepts covered by the jury instructions (e.g., the applicable standard of
care, the burden of proof, categories of potential damages). Before coding a
case, we closely examined the instructions for that case to identify terms
and phrases that the jurors might use if they were drawing from the
instructions, but would be unlikely to use in the absence of the instructions.
The specialized words and phrases in the instructions that presumptively
triggered an instruction code varied from case to case. For example, a slipand-fall case included the instruction: “One of the tests used in determining
whether a condition is unreasonably dangerous is whether it is open and
obvious.” When jurors used the phrases “unreasonably dangerous” or “open
and obvious” during deliberations, this triggered the presumption that the
comment was stimulated by the instructions. Thus, when Juror #1 said, “I
don’t feel like it’s unreasonably dangerous . . . ,” we coded the comment as
an instruction reference.
In talking about the instructions, jurors sometimes directly referred to
the fact that the judge had instructed them on an issue (e.g., “The judge told
us not to speculate.”). More often, however, the reference was indirect,
either because the juror simply incorporated the judge’s directive (e.g.,
“We’re not supposed to speculate.”) or because the juror adopted the
language or concept of the instruction (e.g., in a slip-and-fall case, “But did
he actually know about the dangerous condition?”). We counted jurors’
references to the judicial instructions that were either literal or conceptual.
Literal references explicitly used the language of the instructions (e.g., “We
shouldn’t compensate for her preexisting condition.”), while conceptual
references conveyed the same idea without using the literal language of the
instruction (e.g., “We know that her leg hurt before the accident—we have
to figure out how much of the expenses were due to the accident.”).
We did not code a comment as instruction-based if a juror might have
used the word or phrase or discussed a topic in the absence of an
instruction. For example, when a juror said, “I don’t think it was his fault,”
we did not code this statement as an instruction comment because a juror
who watched the trial but never heard the judge’s instructions might easily
have made this comment, even using the term “fault” in discussing the case.
In contrast, if the juror said, “To find him at fault, we have to decide that his
negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury,” the comment was treated as an
instruction reference because we could infer that the juror was drawing on
the instructions to produce this comment. This approach was conservative
in counting instruction references because we did not count some lawrelated comments that might very well have been stimulated by the
instructions.
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We also counted talk about instructions conservatively when the jurors
discussed damages. Each set of jury instructions included a list of damage
categories tailored to the particular case that jurors were to consider if they
found the defendant at fault (e.g., lost wages, medical expenses). As a
result, every mention of a damage category could be treated as a reference
to the instructions as jurors offered their preferred awards in the case (e.g.,
“Me? I agree with what’s been said—about $1500 for lost wages.”). If we
had considered every remark that mentioned a damage category as an
instruction reference, we would have coded much of the damages
discussion as talk about the instructions, which would have produced a
highly misleading result. To avoid overcounting, we coded only the first
instance in which any juror mentioned a damage category, for example,
“We have to decide how much to give him for lost wages.” We did not code
references to lost wages in the conversation that followed on that topic (i.e.,
as jurors decided how much to award for lost wages). If the jurors changed
the topic (e.g., from lost wages to medical expenses) and a juror later
reintroduced the earlier topic of lost wages, we coded the reintroduction as
an instruction reference. Thus, we treated the first instances as reflecting the
influence of the instruction—as pointing the jurors toward a topic that they
were instructed to discuss. We considered any subsequent mention of the
damage category within the same line of conversation as less clearly linked
to the instructions and therefore did not code them as instruction references.
We did, however, code as instruction references all comments that referred
to the meaning of the category (e.g., “What do they mean by the nature,
extent, and duration of the injury?”), including explicit errors about the
category (e.g., if a juror said that the jury was obligated to award the full
amount of medical expenses covered in the submitted bills, rather than what
they determined was a reasonable amount, we coded this as an instruction
error). This coding system produced a reliable set of coding decisions.50
Because of our decisions to avoid treating ambiguous references to
legal-concepts language as referring to the instructions and to code only the
first reference to a damage category as referring to the instructions, our
assessment of the amount of talk about instructions may somewhat
undercount juror references to instructions. Because we did count every

50

To assess the reliability of this coding, two coders independently coded each comment in five
deliberations to determine whether or not it was an instruction reference. Coding was done using the
index described by Charles P. Smith for analysis of qualitative text by dividing twice the number of
agreements on a category by the sum of the frequency that each coder used the category. See Charles P.
Smith, Content Analysis and Narrative Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH METHODS IN SOCIAL AND
PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 313, 313–27 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds., 2000). The reliability
ranged from 0.84 to 0.96, averaging 0.89 across the five cases. In general, reliability indicators at this
level are viewed as having “almost perfect” reliability. See J. Richard Landis & Gary G. Koch, The
Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 (1977)
(characterizing the strength of different agreement values).
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error whenever it occurred,51 the rate of errors as a proportion of this
conservative measure of talk about instructions provides a generous
assessment of the error rate. Despite this approach, the results show that the
accuracy of juror talk about the instructions was unexpectedly high in light
of the previous evidence on juror comprehension of instructions.52
B. An Overview of Talk About the Law
1. How Much Do Jurors Talk About the Law?.—Across the fifty
cases, the jurors made 13,519 comments about the law, constituting 17.1%
of all comments made during deliberations.53 The jurors thus focused
significant attention on the legal guidance they received from the
instructions, providing convincing evidence that jurors do not simply ignore
jury instructions.54
Another indicator of the attention jurors paid to the instructions is how
quickly instructions entered deliberations as a topic for consideration. We
excluded foreperson selection, which typically occurs at the very beginning
of deliberations in response to the final instructions that jurors receive,55 as
well as any preliminary procedural comments based on the instructions
(e.g., “We don’t all have to agree to reach a verdict.”). Even with these
exclusions, the first exchange on the substance of the applicable law (i.e., at
least two jurors exchanging substantive legal comments) occurred early in
the deliberations on most juries: on thirty-eight of the fifty juries (76%) it
occurred during the first ten minutes. A majority (twenty-six) of the juries
exchanged comments about the substantive instructions during the first five
minutes of deliberations, and another twelve had some exchange during the
first ten minutes.
51

See infra note 64 for an explanation.
See infra Part IV.B.4.
53
The range was between 3.5% and 38.2% per case. Because the deliberations varied in length, the
average percent per case differed slightly from the percent of total comments across cases (16.5% per
case versus 17.1% across all cases).
54
See also REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 85 (1983) (describing a jury simulation involving
a criminal case in which nearly a quarter of the juror comments related to the instructions). Our lower
rate may reflect differences between criminal and civil cases or between real and simulated juries, but it
may also be due to our more conservative approach to attributing juror comments to the influence of
instructions. In contrast, Hastie and his colleagues coded any discussion of determining whether or not
to believe a witness as an instruction reference whether or not the juror mentioned the instruction on
how to judge witness credibility. See Coding Instructions for Reid Hastie Study (on file with authors).
On the ground that individuals naturally, even in the absence of instructions, would attempt to figure out
who was telling the truth when confronted with competing accounts in a trial, we took the more
conservative approach of coding those comments as instruction references only when they referred to
the instruction or the specific criteria it included.
55
CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., STATE BAR OF ARIZ., REVISED ARIZONA JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(CIVIL) Standard 15, at 30 (3d ed. 1997) [hereinafter RAJI (CIVIL) 3d] (“The case is now submitted to
you for decision. When you go to the jury room you will choose a foreman. He or she will preside over
your deliberations.”).
52
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This active use of the instructions by the juries also included reading
portions of the instructions aloud during deliberations. On forty-six of the
fifty juries (92%), at least one juror read an instruction aloud to the group,
and in nearly half of the trials (46%), at least half of the jurors each read at
least one instruction aloud. Thus, at least in a jurisdiction like Arizona,
where each juror receives a copy of the instructions, the availability of the
document as a reference makes it possible for jurors to consult it—and they
do. Note that although the national trend appears to favor giving juries at
least one copy of the jury instructions,56 only a minority of courts currently
supply all jurors with their own copies.57
Finally, we recognized that jurors might discuss instructions with some
frequency but focus on only a few of them, ignoring the bulk of the topics
that the instructions cover. To assess juror coverage of the instructions, we
analyzed how many of the legally relevant case-specific topics covered in
the instructions were referred to by jurors during deliberations. For
example, in a case involving a simple auto accident in which liability is
contested and the plaintiff is claiming permanent injury, case-specific topics
covered by the instructions would include: (1) the claim; (2) the
requirement to show negligence, causation, and damages; (3) the burden of
proof; (4) the damages that can be considered; and (5) the average life
expectancy for a person the plaintiff’s age. If the defendant was alleging
that the plaintiff had a preexisting injury, the instructions would also
include an instruction telling the jury that if it awarded damages, those
damages should assess the degree to which any preexisting condition had
been made worse by the defendant’s fault.58 Similarly, if the accident
involved allegations of comparative fault, the jury would also be instructed
on the allocation of percentage of fault.59
We identified 381 case-specific (i.e., non-boilerplate) instruction topics
across the fifty cases, an average of 7.6 per case, and analyzed whether each
instruction topic was mentioned at least once during deliberations. In the
course of a jury’s deliberations, some instructions became irrelevant. For
56

MIZE ET AL., supra note 30, at 31–32 & tbl.24 (state courts: 68.5%; federal courts: 79.4%).
Id. (state courts: 32.6%; federal court: 39.0%).
58
Jurors received the following instruction in sixteen cases, and in one additional case, the second
paragraph was given:
Plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for any physical or emotional condition that preexisted the fault of defendant. However, if plaintiff had any pre-existing physical or emotional
condition that was aggravated or made worse by defendant’s fault, you must decide the full
amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate plaintiff for that aggravation or
worsening.
You must decide the full amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate plaintiff
for all damages caused by the fault of defendant, even if plaintiff was more susceptible to injury
than a normally healthy person would have been, and even if a normally healthy person would not
have suffered similar injury.
RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Personal Injury Damages 2, at 113.
59
See id. at 40. Jurors were instructed on comparative fault in fourteen cases.
57
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example, if a jury decided that the defendant was not negligent and
therefore not at fault, the instructions on damages became irrelevant. If a
jury decided that the defendant was at fault but the plaintiff had no
permanent injury, the instruction on life expectancy became irrelevant.60 Of
the 381 case-specific instruction topics, 22 were legally irrelevant in light of
the particular jury’s decisions on other issues. The juries specifically talked
about 269 of the 359 remaining topics, or 74.9% of the relevant casespecific instruction topics, during their deliberations. The analysis of
coverage thus indicates that the jurors were generally attentive to the
instructions. In a few instances, however, the jurors did fail to turn to the
instructions for guidance and that failure may have contributed to juror
confusion on the relevant law.
2. Predicting the Amount of Talk.—We might expect that longer
trials or, more specifically, lengthier jury instructions, would require jurors
to spend more time focusing on the jury instructions. It appears, however,
that jurors allocate their deliberation time to instructions based on less
obvious criteria. In each case, we asked the judge to rate how easy or
difficult it was to understand the jury instructions in the case on a one to
seven scale (1 = very difficult to 7 = very easy). The judicial rating of the
difficulty of the instructions was a significant predictor of the percentage of
time jurors devoted to the judicial instructions during their deliberations
(r = -0.31, p < 0.03).61 Neither the length of the trial (r = 0.12, p > 0.40) nor
the number of pages of instructions (r = 0.13, p > 0.30) was a significant
predictor of the time jurors spent on instructions. In a multivariate analysis
that included all three potential predictors, judicial rating of instruction
difficulty remained the only significant predictor (R2 = 0.10, p < 0.03).62
3. The Instructions that Juries Talk About.—As noted above, all
juries received three kinds of instructions. First, every jury received the
boilerplate preliminary and final instructions describing general rules
applicable to all cases. Second, each jury also received case-specific
instructions that varied across cases and included final instructions as well
as judicial rulings on objections during trial and judicial responses to jury
questions submitted on a legal issue during trial or deliberations. The third
60

In twenty-one of the cases, the jurors received an instruction on life expectancy. The jurors
mentioned the instruction in ten of the cases. They did not mention the life expectancy instruction in six
cases in which they found in favor of the defense on liability or in another four cases in which they
rejected the plaintiff’s claim of continuing injury. Thus, in only one of the twenty-one cases did they fail
to discuss this instruction when it was legally relevant.
61
N = forty-nine cases for all of these correlations due to one missing value for a judge’s rating of
instruction complexity.
62 2
R is the squared multiple correlation, which represents the proportion of the variation in the
response variable (here, the time jurors spent on instructions) that is explained by the model that
includes all three predictor variables. In contrast, each r is simply the correlation between one predictor
variable and the response variable.
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type of instruction, instructions about the verdict forms, was delivered just
before the jury began its deliberations when the judge read the verdict forms
to the jury. The instructions about the verdict forms were a hybrid of
boilerplate (e.g., directions to select a foreperson) and case-specific
information (e.g., information on the verdict forms that depended on the
claims in the case). To track where in the instructions the jurors focused
their attention, we identified whether each juror’s comment referred to a
general (boilerplate) instruction, a specific (case-specific) instruction, or a
verdict form (hybrid) instruction.
Not surprisingly, the primary focus of the jurors was on case-specific
instructions, which accounted for 72.2% of all instruction references.
Comments about the verdict form instructions, which occurred primarily at
the end of deliberations, accounted for 10.3% of the instruction references.
Nonetheless, jurors did not ignore the boilerplate instructions: these
instructions accounted for 17.5% of the juror comments relating to
instructions. For example, regarding the admonition not to speculate:
JUROR #1:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #3:

Well, he missed those hours [of work], but how, that is not to
say he didn’t get paid when he was gone. If you or I get in a car
accident—
[interrupting] But we can’t consider that, that’s speculation.
Because we don’t know that.
Yeah, even though we would like to.

On more than half of the juries (62%), at least one juror warned another
juror not to speculate, and in a majority of those cases, the juror made a
specific reference to the judge’s admonition.
Similarly, the boilerplate instructions told the jurors to “[c]onsider all
of the evidence in the light of reason, common sense, and experience,” and
jurors noted that guidance. In almost a third (30%) of the cases, jurors
referred to the instruction telling them to use their common sense.63 As we
indicate below, all three types of instructions (boilerplate, case-specific, and
hybrid) were sources of some confusion for the jurors.
4. Accuracy of Talk About Instructions.—We coded the accuracy of
each comment a juror made about a legal instruction.64 As Table 1 indicates,
63

The attorneys tended to reinforce the advice that the jurors should use their common sense: one or
both attorneys urged it in their closing argument in more than two-thirds (68%) of the cases.
64
Inaccurate comments included any comment that erroneously interpreted or misapplied an
instruction or advanced an inaccurate legal proposition. We also coded as errors questions about the law
that included or implicitly suggested an incorrect answer (e.g., “Do we need to find the defendant liable
if she admitted she was negligent?”). The rationale was that the question indicated juror confusion about
the law. If a comment included both correct and incorrect content, it was coded as incorrect (e.g., “We
should not speculate. Therefore, I think it’s going to be difficult to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.”). Full coding instructions are on file with the authors. The first author and law student assistants
categorized comments about instructions as accurate or inaccurate and discussed all questions that arose.
In addition, two experienced evidence professors reviewed a set of comments that had been coded as
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most of the instruction comments (79.2%) were accurate across the fifty
cases.
TABLE 1: JUROR TALK ABOUT INSTRUCTIONS DURING DELIBERATIONS
Nature of Instruction Comment
Accurate
Comprehension Error
Resistance Error
Accuracy Ambiguous
Total Instruction Comments

Percent
79.16%
16.04%
3.24%
1.55%
99.99%

N
(10,702)
(2169)
(438)
(210)
(13,519)

Table 1 also reveals that a total of 19.3% of the comments about
instructions were incorrect (an average rate of 20.3% per case), and in a
small percentage of instances (1.6%) the accuracy of the juror’s comment
was ambiguous. Thus, the overall accuracy of discussion about the law was
high. Nonetheless, jurors made 2607 legally inaccurate comments across
the 50 cases, an average of 52 errors per case. The errors were not evenly
distributed across the cases: half of the cases had 30 or fewer inaccurate
comments, but 6 deliberations had more than 100 errors. The errors ranged
from 0.0% to 67.8% of the instruction talk in these deliberations, with a
median of 18.2%.
The strongest predictor of the number of instruction errors was the
length of the jury instructions (r = 0.48, p < 0.001). Together with the
jurors’ mean rating of instruction difficulty (r = -0.41, p < 0.01), this
accounted for 31% of the variation in number of errors across cases
(R2 = 0.31, p < 0.001).65 Of course, deliberations tended to last longer as the
trial length increased (r = 0.64, p < 0.001) and as jury instructions
lengthened (r = 0.34, p < 0.02), so it is not surprising that the number of
comments about instructions, including incorrect ones, climbed as
deliberations lengthened (r = 0.82, p < 0.001). To test what predicted
accuracy of instruction talk, while controlling for the length of
deliberations, we examined possible predictors of the percent of instruction
comments that were inaccurate. There was no significant relationship
between trial length, instruction length, or judge or jury ratings of
instruction difficulty, and the percent of comments about instructions that
accurate or inaccurate. Both of them labeled one comment as an error that we had coded as accurate.
The juror had said: “Fault is negligence if it is the cause [rather than a] cause of the plaintiff’s injury.”
Although the juror then concluded that the defendant had not failed to use reasonable care so that the
mistake had no effect on the juror’s position on liability, the coding decision was incorrect.
65
The length of the trial and the judge’s rating of the difficulty of the instructions were also
significantly correlated with the number of errors (r = 0.31, p < 0.01 for length of the trial and r = -0.43,
p < 0.01, for judge’s rating), but did not account for further variance beyond that accounted for by the
length of instructions and juror rating of complexity.
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were incorrect (correlations ranged from 0.02 to -0.22). Thus, longer jury
instructions are simply associated with longer deliberations and more talk
about instructions, both accurate and inaccurate.
Many of the errors jurors made in discussing the instructions were
minor (e.g., making a statement that all jurors had to sign the verdict form,
although the instructions said that only the presiding juror would sign if the
jury was unanimous). Other errors had serious implications capable of
affecting case outcomes (e.g., “Is that [the defendant’s] problem, or is that
[the agent’s] problem?” in a case in which the instructions specified that the
named agent was an agent of the defendant for purposes of the claims
involved in the case).
Miscomprehension was the primary source of the instruction errors
(83.2%). The remaining errors (16.8%) reflected resistance rather than juror
confusion, occurring when a juror understood but rejected the appropriate
legal standard.66 In the analysis that follows, we treat the comprehension
and resistance errors separately. Although the resistance errors were
substantially less frequent than comprehension errors, with 8.8 resistance
errors per case as opposed to 43.4 comprehension errors per case, the
resistance errors reveal areas of modest conflict between jurors and the law.
Arising from active rejection of legal rules rather than from confusion about
what those rules are, resistance errors call for a different response.
C. Comprehension Errors
1. Overview of Comprehension Errors.—The comprehension errors
revealed during deliberations took three forms.67 The first type, language
errors, arose when a juror misunderstood the meaning of a word or phrase,
either because the word or phrase was an unfamiliar legal term (e.g.,
tortious inference) or because the juror failed to apply the plain language of
the instruction (e.g., the juror failed to notice an “or” or an “and”). The
other two types of errors resulted from structural weaknesses in the
instructions (e.g., the juror identified what appeared to be, but were not,
inconsistencies between components of the instructions, or made
66

To check the reliability of whether an error was a resistance error rather than a comprehension
error, two coders examined all instruction errors in the same six cases and the conversation that
preceded and followed each instruction error, coding each error comment as: (1) a comprehension error
or (2) a resistance error, based on: (a) expressing explicit defiance in the comment itself, (b) continuing
to offer inaccurate comments after at least two corrections from other jurors without disputing the
accuracy of their corrections, or (c) persisting in the error after the judge responded to a question with a
clear correction. Using the index described by Smith, supra note 50, reliability ranged from 0.89 to 1.0,
averaging 0.95 across the six cases. Resistance comments are discussed infra Part IV.D.
67
These three types of errors reflected a total of eleven sources of error, discussed infra Part
IV.C.2–IV.C.4. To assess the reliability of this coding, two coders independently coded the comments in
eight deliberations to determine the source of each error. Using Cohen’s Kappa statistic of inter-rater
agreement for categorical items, see Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales,
20 EDUC. & PSYCHOL. MEASUREMENT 37 (1960), the inter-rater reliability was 0.95.
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connections where none existed) or from omission errors, which occurred
when the instructions did not explicitly cover a topic or issue (e.g., the
instructions listed the legally relevant elements that would fairly
compensate the plaintiff, but did not explicitly rule out attorney’s fees as a
legally relevant element for compensation). Table 2 shows the distribution
of all three types of errors, the number of cases in which each type of error
occurred, how frequently each type of error was corrected, and the
distribution of the errors that remained uncorrected. Corrections occurred
when the other jurors or the judge responded to the error with the correct
meaning or application of the law.68
TABLE 2: SOURCES OF COMPREHENSION ERRORS
Sources of
Comprehension
Errors

Total
Comprehension
Errors

Total Cases
with Errors

Percent
Corrected

Uncorrected
Comprehension
Errors

Language
Structural
Omission
Total

601 (27.7%)
334 (15.4%)
1234 (56.9%)
2169 (100.0%)

46
16
44
48

49.1%
44.6%
46.0%
46.7%

306 (26.4%)
185 (16.1%)
666 (57.6%)
1157 (100.0%)

As Table 2 indicates, comprehension errors occurred in nearly all of
the cases (forty-eight out of fifty), but Table 2 also raises questions about
the assumption that miscomprehension errors arise primarily because jurors
cannot translate the unfamiliar language of the jury instructions. Fewer than
three in ten (27.7%) of the inaccurate comments about instructions reflected
language errors, an average of twelve comments per case. Moreover, almost
half of all comprehension errors (46.7%) were explicitly corrected by
another juror (32.3%), by the judge responding to a juror question (9.2%),
or by both another juror and the judge (5.2%). The language errors occurred
much less frequently than the omission errors. In the end, language errors
accounted for only one in four uncorrected comprehension errors (26.4%).
Omission errors, in contrast, were the most common type of error,
accounting for more than half of both initial errors (56.9%) and uncorrected
errors (57.6%). With this overview of the general categories of errors, we
now turn to an analysis of the errors within each category.69

68

A few judicial responses failed to answer the jurors’ question, so the error was not treated as
corrected in these instances.
69
Reliability of type of error was computed based on the eleven possible categories of error: two
types of language errors, two types of structural errors, and seven types of omission errors. Because of
the large number of coding categories, we conducted the reliability analysis based on eight cases. The
kappa was 0.94.
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2. Language Errors.—The opaque language of jury instructions is
the primary culprit typically blamed for juror errors.70 We identified two
types of language errors: (1) plain meaning errors and (2) technical meaning
errors. Plain meaning errors occurred when a juror misread or ignored
nontechnical language in the instructions that had the same meaning it
would have in a nonlegal context (e.g., read or interpreted an “and” as an
“or”). Technical language errors occurred when a juror misunderstood or
misapplied a term that is only used in a legal context (e.g., plaintiff) or has a
specialized legal meaning that is different from its meaning in a nonlegal
context (e.g., competent). Table 3 shows the two types of language errors
that occurred during these deliberations:
TABLE 3: LANGUAGE ERRORS
Type of Error

Total Errors

Plain Meaning
Technical Meaning71
Total

268 (44.6%)
333 (55.4%)
601 (100.0%)

Cases with
Errors
42
31
46

Percent
Corrected
75.4%
27.9%
49.1%

Uncorrected
Errors
66 (21.6%)
240 (78.4%)
306 (100.0%)

a. Plain meaning.—Nearly half of the language errors (44.6%)
occurred because a juror misread or ignored the plain language of an
instruction. These errors occurred even though each juror had a copy of the
jury instructions. The availability of the written instructions did, however,
assist the jurors in correcting errors. Three-quarters (75.4%) of these “plain
meaning” errors were explicitly corrected, often by a juror using the written
instruction as evidence of the accurate meaning of the instruction. For
example, in a products liability case, a juror said, “[I]t was not dangerous
but it was defective. Now the question is: do we award any money for [it]
being defective?” The instruction specified that liability could only be
found if the product were both defective and unreasonably dangerous, and
of course it was also necessary to show that the defect had caused the
injury. Although the juror’s error was not immediately corrected, later on in
the deliberations when the juror repeated it, another juror (referring to the
written instruction) said, “I think the ‘and’ is important there,” and offered
an example of how food could be burned, and therefore be defective, but
70

See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Refocusing the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: Some Doubt
About Reasonable Doubt, 78 TEX. L. REV. 105, 119–32 (1999) (collecting articles on comprehension
tests before offering a rationale for changing the definition of reasonable doubt provided to jurors based
on linguistics and cognitive psychology).
71
One hundred eighty-nine of the 333 technical meaning errors came from a single case in which
the jurors submitted a question to the judge and the judge directed the jurors back to the page that had
prompted the question, leaving the jurors to struggle further. Of these errors, 176 concerned a single
phrase in the instructions that was the subject of the question, and none of these errors were corrected.
For discussion of this case, see infra text accompanying note 73. If these 176 comments are removed,
the percent of technical meaning errors that were corrected would rise from 27.9% to 59.2%.
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not dangerous. The others jurors agreed with the correct interpretation.
They ultimately found for the defense.
In another example, a juror in a slip-and-fall case failed to recognize
that the instruction described multiple alternative ways that could lead to a
finding that the defendant had notice of a dangerous condition—missing the
“or” in the instruction. The juror said: “If they didn’t do something to create
a dangerous condition, they’re not responsible.” Although the relevant
instruction indicated that creating a dangerous condition was one way that a
defendant might obtain notice of the condition, this juror failed to note the
two other ways set out in the instruction that could also provide an
attribution of the requisite notice: if the defendant had actual knowledge or
if the condition had existed for long enough that the defendant should have
known about it. Although no one corrected the error in this case, the jurors
concluded that the defendant had created the dangerous condition, so the
error did not influence the course of the jury’s deliberations or the outcome
of the case.
Even words that were understandable sometimes caused difficulty
when the concept was counterintuitive for some jurors. A case involving a
claim about a product purchased from a corporation by a consumer included
an instruction for the jury on agency law. The instruction explained that a
corporation can act only through its employees, agents, directors, or
officers, and that the defendant corporation admitted that another company
was its agent for purposes of the claims in the case. Several of the jurors
were willing to accept the agency relationship only after a juror pointed out
the specific instruction.
b. Technical meaning.—Technical legal language was the
second source of language errors for the jurors. When the jury encountered
a term they recognized as undefined and unfamiliar, they sent the judge a
question about it (e.g., tortious). The more common source of confusion
from technical language arose when a legal term of art consisted of words
that were familiar to jurors in other contexts. For example, the jurors who
were told, “An owner is competent to testify as to the value of his vehicle,
whether they are qualified as an expert or not,” did not understand that the
instruction merely permitted the owner to state what he thought the car was
worth.72 Instead, they interpreted the instruction as a way of saying that the
owner should be assumed to know the value of the vehicle:

72

It was arguably odd to provide an instruction to the jury on this issue at all because the decision to
permit the owner to testify about the value of the vehicle was an admissibility question reached by the
judge.
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Isn’t it saying here that [inaudible] the owner—whether being
an expert or not—can determine the worth of the vehicle?
Yeah, the owner can determine . . . .

The culprit was the use of the phrase “competent to testify,” a phrase with a
specialized meaning in a legal context. Similarly, the mental state required
for liability is a crucial element in law. Jurors in tort cases are generally
instructed on negligence, but their deliberations sometimes suggest that
they are evaluating the defendant on a mental state more appropriate to an
intentional tort or a criminal act. For example, a juror argued on behalf of a
defendant: “[The defendant’s action] wasn’t intentional.” In another case, a
juror confused knowledge and negligence:
JUROR #1:

But if he didn’t know the law, how is he negligent? If he didn’t
have any idea . . . .

And in a third case, a juror expressed discomfort with holding a teenager
fully responsible for an injury he caused:
JUROR #9:

I know he hurt him, but [the defendant] was a kid. It was an
accident. He didn’t purposely set out to be negligent. He was
just being a kid; he was stupid.

And on occasion, jurors simply got tangled up in the language. For
example, jurors were evaluating the standard for judging the fault of a
defendant when a fire broke out after the defendant repaired the plaintiff’s
furnace. The misstatements of Jurors #3 and #6 focusing on intentionality
were corrected by Juror #1:
JUROR #3:
JUROR #6:
JUROR #3:
JUROR #1:
JUROR #6:
JUROR #3:
JUROR #6:

It was because of the work [by the defendant] that was done
that it happened, but there was no intentional negligence.
Right, exactly. It was an accident.
It was not done intentionally.
But [the instruction] does not say intentional, does it?
No.
No, it doesn’t.
It just says, “Negligence is the failure to use reasonable care.”

On another occasion, jurors misunderstood the meaning of a technical
category that was expressed in general terms. The jurors carefully read the
instruction on damages, focusing on the phrase “services rendered.” They
concluded that it directed the jury to include an award for attorney’s fees.73
This outlier case accounted for more than half of the total technical

73

This interpretation was not irrational; the damages section in the instructions (as in other standard
pattern instructions) included the following elements of damages: “Reasonable expenses of necessary
medical care, treatment, and services rendered.” The reference to services rendered is intended to refer
only to medical services, but the phrasing is hardly unambiguous.
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language errors in the entire set of fifty cases.74 As the jurors in this case
struggled to determine how much they should add for attorney’s fees, they
submitted a question to the judge, who responded by advising them to look
at the damages page in the instructions. They had already focused their
attention on that page, so the judge’s response provided no assistance in
correcting their misunderstanding, and they interpreted the answer as
requiring them to estimate the attorney’s fees. The result is that they
explicitly added one-third to the damage award that the group had already
assessed.
In thirty cases (60%), a juror referred to the burden or standard of
proof during deliberations. Most of the 175 references were correct (81%).
For example:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #5:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #6:
JUROR #4:
JUROR #6:
JUROR #3:
JUROR #8:

I read that [the standard of proof] as being [a] very, very low
standard, 50%, greater than 50%, so it’s just more probably
true than not.
It’s not like beyond a reasonable doubt.
We’re not up there on the high. It’s just—
That’s correct.
I agree with that.
But the burden is on the plaintiff.
On the plaintiff, not on the defendant.
That’s right. He has to prove, more probably true than not true,
which is just about 50%, so it’s something to keep in mind.

Nonetheless, thirty-three (19%) of the references were incorrect. These
errors occurred in fifteen cases and were typically made by a single juror
who applied the reasonable doubt standard from criminal law when the
relevant standard was a preponderance of the evidence. For example, a juror
in a medical malpractice case voiced “reasonable doubt” about what caused
the plaintiff’s injury, although in the end he supported finding the defendant
liable. In a second case, involving an automobile accident, a juror voiced
“reasonable doubt” about whether the accident caused the injury:
JUROR #8:

But we have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the
[injuries] are from the accident.

A juror in a third case used “reasonable doubt” to evaluate the plaintiff’s
credibility: “I think we have a reasonable doubt [as] to his credibility.” On a
few occasions, a juror mentioning reasonable doubt was technically
incorrect in the use of the phrase, but may have been using the phrase for
emphasis, rather than as a standard of proof. For example, in a case
involving a plaintiff whose vehicle hit the back of another car and who
claimed that the automobile accident occurred because the driver in front
had been going too slowly for conditions:
74

See supra note 71.
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Okay, beyond a reasonable doubt I would say . . . [the driver]
should have had enough time to stop the vehicle at least down
to thirty.

The jury instructions in these cases never mentioned the phrase
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” but the phrase is so much a part of the
common vernacular that it understandably creeps into the language that
jurors use. The attorneys in thirty-four of the cases discussed the standard of
proof in their closing arguments.75 In fifteen of these thirty-four cases, one
of the attorneys attempted to clarify the standard of proof in these civil
cases by contrasting it with the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof
in a criminal case.76 Juror errors discussing the standard of proof occurred in
two of the fifteen cases in which an attorney offered the contrast, and in
eight of the nineteen cases in which attorneys mentioned the standard of
proof but did not explicitly offer the contrast with beyond a reasonable
doubt. Although a larger sample would be needed to test the stability of this
difference (the difference between two cases out of fifteen (13%) versus
eight cases out of nineteen (42%) is not statistically significant77),
contrasting examples tend to aid comprehension in educational settings, so
it would not be surprising if an explicit contrast helped jurors to understand
the meaning of the standard of proof. Indeed, some courts do include this
contrast in their instructions rather than depending on attorney argument to
supply it, which is a more dependable way to ensure that the correct
message is conveyed.78
75

Note that the jury instructions in all cases mentioned who had the burden of proof for each claim
and specified what the standard of proof was (e.g., in negligence cases, that “the claim is more probably
true than not”). In fifteen cases, the standard of proof was not mentioned in closing arguments, and in a
sixteenth, we were unable to obtain a transcript of the closing arguments.
76
In one of the fifteen cases, the contrast offered was between “clear and convincing” proof and the
standard of “more probably true than not true.”
77
Even if the two sets of cases differ in their rates of error, with only a total of thirty-four cases, the
comparison does not have sufficient statistical power to confidently reject the possibility that a
difference, even one as large as the one obtained here (13% vs. 42%), could be due to chance. For
further information on power and statistical significance, see JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER
ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES (2d ed. 1988).
78
See, e.g., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS 28 (1987) (“Some of you
may have served as jurors in civil cases, where you were told that it is only necessary to prove that a fact
is more likely true than not true. In criminal cases, the government’s proof must be more powerful than
that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.”); JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS, CACI No. 200, (2012), available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/
caci_2012_edtion.pdf (“In criminal trials, the prosecution must prove that the defendant is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. But in civil trials, such as this one, the party who is required to prove something
need prove only that it is more likely to be true than not true.”); see also Elisabeth Stoffelmayr & Shari
Seidman Diamond, The Conflict Between Precision and Flexibility in Explaining “Beyond a Reasonable
Doubt,” 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 769, 777‒78 (2000) (concluding that criminal-case jury
instructions that explicitly contrast the relative burdens of proof in criminal versus civil cases are more
effective in focusing jurors on the evidence, rather than subjective moral beliefs or personal
experiences).
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A third of the thirty-three errors that jurors made in discussing the
burden or standard of proof were corrected by other jurors, leaving twentytwo uncorrected comprehension errors about burden or standard of proof. In
addition, jurors on two cases persisted in misusing the standard after several
jurors corrected them, suggesting that their comments may have reflected
resistance rather than errors based on miscomprehension.
A final group of sixteen technical language errors occurred because
jury instructions often use general descriptors for the parties and other
relevant individuals or businesses involved in the lawsuit, such as
“employer.” When the referent is clear because there is only one plaintiff
and one defendant, that approach causes no difficulty. However, when the
defendants vary for different claims (e.g., when some claims apply to a
defendant employee as an individual and other claims apply to the employer
through the actions of the employee), jurors may occasionally struggle to
identify the appropriate defendant for each claim. Similarly, in comparative
fault cases, the defendant rather than the plaintiff has the burden of proof to
show that the plaintiff was at fault. Jurors in those cases, while correctly
identifying the defendant as the party with the burden of proof, simply
called that party the plaintiff for that claim. For example, in a case of
comparative fault:
JUROR #3:

[W]hat I’m having a problem [with is] that . . . the defendants
were the cause, but [the plaintiff] is also one of the
defendants . . . .

The technical language errors tended to confuse individual jurors on
occasion, but in only one trial was there clear evidence that language
miscomprehension affected the damages awarded by the jury. In that case,
described earlier,79 the jury explicitly agreed to add attorney’s fees for
“service rendered.” A majority of the jurors participated in the conversation
about the proper amount to add, and no juror questioned the legitimacy of
including attorney’s fees as an appropriate component of services rendered.
On other juries, evidence of language miscomprehension was reflected only
in the comments of a few jurors, and, although the error may have
influenced an individual juror’s thinking, it did not explicitly emerge as a
basis for the jury’s verdict.
3. Structural Errors.—Jury instructions cover a range of issues.
Some of these issues are related to one another, as when a claim of
negligent supervision is contingent on another underlying claim. Others are
unrelated. Jury instructions, however, do not explicitly signal when
instructions are related and how these relationships function. As a result,
jurors sometimes assume connections that are unwarranted and miss
connections that are present. The failure to disclose the structure of
79

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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relationships among the instructions is promoted by the piecemeal way in
which jury instructions are produced. Each side submits a set of proposed
instructions, each on a separate page.80 Instructions are then typically
assembled by piecing together a set of separate instructions that cover
different topics (e.g., the concept that corporations and individuals are
entitled to the same fair and impartial consideration, the elements required
for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the potential
categories of damages), with a separate instruction on each page. This
piecemeal approach enables the court, with the assistance of the parties, to
create a packet of instructions by inserting acceptable individual
instructions proposed by one of the parties, modifying, substituting, or
adding instructions where necessary. To apply the law, however, jurors
must be able to interpret the instructions in light of one another, so that if
related instructions in the final packet do not appear on the same page or on
adjacent pages, jurors may not see the connection or relevant differences
between them. The patchwork construction of instructions provides no
guidance in identifying connections, that is, in distinguishing between
related and unrelated instructions.
The primary elements in civil cases concern claims, liability
requirements, and damage instructions. We identified two types of
structural errors: (1) mistakes from combining unrelated claims, liability
standards, or damage instructions, or inappropriately distinguishing
between related claims, liability standards, and damage instructions; and
(2) other combination errors. As Table 4 indicates, structural errors
occurred in nearly a third of the cases (sixteen of fifty) as jurors attempted
to combine related instructions and avoid combining unrelated ones.
TABLE 4: STRUCTURAL ERRORS
Type of Error

Total Errors

Cases
with
Errors

Percent
Corrected

Uncorrected
Errors

Fitting Together
Claims/Liability/Damages
Other Combination Errors

160 (47.9%)
174 (52.1%)

10
9

26.9%
60.9%

117 (63.2%)
68 (36.8%)

Total

334 (100.0%)

16

44.6%

185 (100.0%)

a. Fitting together claims/liability/damages.—The first type of
structural error, accounting for almost half of the errors in this category,
involves fitting together the basic components of civil cases: claims,
liability, and damages. Juries in civil cases are often faced with multiple
80

See, e.g., D. OR. LOCAL R. CIV. P. 51-1(d), available at http://www.ord.uscourts.gov/en/localrules-of-civil-procedure-2012/lr-51-instructions-to-the-jury (“Format Requirements: (1) Each instruction
must begin on a separate page. . . . (3) Each instruction must embrace only one subject . . . .”). The trials
in the Arizona Jury Project used the Oregon format as well.
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claims and, when liability is contested, must be instructed on both liability
and damages. While half the cases in the Arizona Jury Project involved a
single claim against one defendant, the remaining half contained more
complex allegations: multiple claims, claims and counterclaims,
comparative fault, or an alleged nonparty at fault. All of the errors involving
fitting together claims or liability and damages occurred in ten of the
twenty-five cases with more complex claim structures. Because this source
of confusion in jury instructions has not been identified in any prior
research, we give several examples of the challenges jurors faced by having
to link different parts of the instructions together. Thus, for example,
confusion in one case arose among multiple claims that included a
contingent claim of negligent supervision. Unless the jury found the
employee liable for one of the multiple underlying tort claims, they could
not find the defendant employer liable for negligent supervision. No single
sentence in the instructions expressed precisely this point, which would
have likely assisted the jurors in linking the underlying claims against the
employee to those concerning the employer. It took an extended discussion
by the jury81 and a question to the judge before this relationship among the
claims was clarified.
A second case involved claims of breach of contract and violation of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, which lead to different damage
categories, the benefit of the bargain for the breach of contract claim and
consequential damages (e.g., emotional distress, inconvenience, anxiety) for
the claimed violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. The jurors
believed that they had awarded all that was appropriate on the breach of
contract claim and then struggled with the verdict forms, which included
information about the other claim. The placement of the damages elements
on separate pages of the jury instructions made it difficult for the jurors to
match them with the appropriate claims. Sheepishly, they asked the judge
for help and only at that point were able to come up with a solution.
The instructions in tort cases tell the jury that fault requires a showing
of negligence, causation, and damages.82 Most jurors in the study
understood that damages cannot be awarded unless negligence is shown,
but in five cases, a juror missed the connection between the need to show
negligence as well as causation and damages in order to find fault,
expressing the desire to make an award without finding the defendant
negligent. In all five cases, that preference immediately drew a response
from fellow jurors who cited the instructions as authority for negligence as
a necessary predicate to liability.
The more common errors involving fit concerned the fit between
claims and damages as jurors negotiated the relationship between liability

81
82

The discussion spanned eighty-three minutes of deliberations.
See RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Fault 1–3, at 33‒35.
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and damages. When a case involves claims of comparative fault and the
jury determines that the defendant was at least partially at fault, the legal
standard calls for the jury to identify the full damages suffered by the
plaintiff and the percentage of fault attributable to the plaintiff.83 The court
then will reduce the total damages by the percentage attributable to the
plaintiff, and the plaintiff will receive the resulting damage award.84 The
jurors in the fourteen cases involving comparative fault were instructed to
determine first whether the defendant was at fault to any degree, then to
determine total damages, and finally to decide the comparative fault
percentage allocation.85 This order, which required the jurors to move from
liability (is there any?) to damages and back to liability (comparative fault
allocation), appears to conflict with the natural inclination of the jurors,
who violated the instruction in five of the nine comparative fault cases in
which they found the defendant at least partially at fault. In these five cases,
they determined the percentage allocation of fault before turning to the
consideration of damages.
In the comparative fault cases, the more serious error in following the
instruction occurred in the computation of the damages. Late in the
instructions, jurors are told that if they find the defendant liable, they must
decide the full amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate
the plaintiff for a set of case-specific elements of damages.86 In four cases,
the jurors decided what they thought the plaintiff should receive and raised
the damage amount to preserve the amount that would remain after the
83

See id. Fault 8, at 40.
Arizona is a pure comparative fault jurisdiction in which damages are reduced in proportion to
the percentage of fault attributed to the plaintiff. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2505(A) (2003).
85
The following instruction was given in each of the fourteen cases involving an allegation of
comparative fault between the plaintiff and defendant:
If you find that defendant was not at fault, then your verdict must be for defendant.
If you find that defendant was at fault, then defendant is liable to plaintiff and your verdict
must be for plaintiff. You should then determine the full amount of plaintiff’s damages and enter
that amount on the verdict form. You should then consider defendant’s claim that plaintiff was at
fault . . . .
RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Fault 8, at 40.
86
The instruction stated:
If you find [any] defendant liable to plaintiff, you must then decide the full amount of money
that will reasonably and fairly compensate plaintiff or each of the following elements of damages
proved by the evidence to have resulted from the fault of [any] [defendant] [party] [person]:
(1) The nature, extent, and duration of the injury.
(2) The pain, discomfort, suffering, disability, disfigurement, and anxiety already
experienced, and reasonably probable to be experienced in the future as a result of the
injury.
(3) Reasonable expenses of necessary medical care, treatment, and services rendered, and
reasonably probable to be incurred in the future.
(4) Lost earnings to date, and any decrease in earning power or capacity in the future.
(5) Loss of love, care, affection, companionship, and other pleasure of the [marital] [family]
relationship.
Id. Personal Injury Damages 1, at 112 (footnote omitted).
84
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percentage of plaintiff liability was subtracted from the total damage
amount. Thus, they fused the liability and damage decisions in order to
arrive at what they viewed as fair compensation. There was no indication
that these jurors realized they were not following the instructions. Thus, the
juries typically would carefully assess the legitimacy of each amount
claimed (e.g., how much really would have been earned, whether the
plaintiff needed all of the treatment, how much the likely future medical
costs would actually be), frequently substantially reducing the requested
amounts to arrive at what they viewed as more reasonable estimates of
expenses. Nonetheless, many of the jurors explicitly expressed concern
about whether the plaintiff would receive enough to cover the costs incurred
by the plaintiff and considered how to produce an award that would reflect
both their assessment of comparative fault and a way to arrive at the
compensation level they thought was appropriate for the injured party. For
example:
JUROR #3:

I was taking the total and then multiplying it by 1.2 and then
we throw whatever makes it to that total in medical and then
we know when they take the 80% with a 20% reduction it will
be back to the full value without any more pain and suffering.87

The jury accepted this calculation in arriving at its award. In a second case,
in which the jurors saw the plaintiff and defendant as more equally at fault,
the jurors also agreed that they would have to raise the total damages to
“gross it up” to enable the plaintiff to “pay her bills and pay for Tylenol and
go to the chiropractor again.” A third jury, having determined that the
plaintiff was 25% at fault, raised the award to cover “the percentage she
will lose due to fault.” A fourth jury, having decided to allocate 20% of the
fault to the plaintiff, agreed to raise the award according to the formula
suggested by one of the jurors: “So, he’s gonna [sic] get four-fifths of X. If
we want X to be the right amount to get there, you need to have five-fourths
of it which is one and one-fourth which is 1.25.”
Each of the other five juries making awards in comparative fault cases
had at least one comment either indicating an error in considering damages
before allocating percentage of fault or a juror who wanted to adjust the
damage level to affect the ultimate award. But unlike the juries described in
the preceding paragraph, none of these five juries explicitly adjusted their
award with an eye toward what the plaintiff would receive in light of the
comparative fault percentages. However, several jurors on these cases
argued for higher damage levels, recognizing that the amounts they were
discussing would be reduced by the percent of fault. Juror #4 takes this
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The math calculation is in error here. If the jurors decided that the plaintiff should end up with
$10,000 and awarded $10,000 × 1.2, the award of $12,000 would be reduced by 20% and would end up
being $9,600. The appropriate multiplier to achieve the jury’s goal would be to multiply by 1.25.
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position in the following example, arguing in favor of a higher total damage
amount:
JUROR #6:
JUROR #4:

Well, I might give him $[X]88 the first year, ’cause [sic] he did
suffer a lot.
I would leave it at $[2X] ’cause [sic] he still is going to lose
half of that and he’s just going to get $[X] of it.

Thus, the demands on the jury to assess liability and damages as separate
decisions are difficult for the jurors to understand and follow in
comparative fault cases, at least as jury instructions are currently
constructed. Before comparative fault emerged as the dominant legal
regime for torts, some legal scholars advocated the use of bifurcated trials
that separated consideration of liability and damages.89 The behavior of the
jurors in these comparative fault cases adds additional evidence questioning
the jury’s ability to separate liability and damages. We have considered
these fusions of liability and damage assessments to reflect comprehension
problems. Alternatively, the jurors in these cases may be revealing a
preferred theory of damages that the law does not currently recognize:
injured plaintiffs should be entitled to recover some of the costs associated
with injuries that were caused by the defendant’s negligence (e.g., medical
expenses, but not pain and suffering), even if the plaintiff contributed to the
injuries. Either way, the deliberations of these juries suggest that
instructions under the current legal rules have not fully achieved the goal of
separating consideration of liability and damages in comparative fault cases.
Errors occurred frequently in the comparative fault cases, most of the errors
remained uncorrected, and the amount of damages awarded was affected in
at least four of the nine comparative fault cases that involved damages.
b. Other combination errors.—Faced with pages of instructions,
the jurors occasionally compared other unrelated instructions and
incorrectly found connections between them where none existed.
Examination of these errors offers clues about the types of instructions that
are likely to produce such errors. For example, when a corporation or a
business is a party, jurors generally receive an instruction admonishing
them to give the corporation or business the same consideration they would
88

In this and other quotes from deliberations, some damage amounts or irrelevant factual details
were changed to protect the identity of the case, consistent with our obligation to preserve
confidentiality. In some instances, the symbols X and Y were substituted for specific dollar amounts or
names used in juror comments.
89
See Julius H. Miner, Court Congestion: A New Approach, 45 A.B.A. J. 1265, 1268 (1959);
Warren F. Schwartz, Severance—A Means of Minimizing the Role of Burden and Expense in
Determining the Outcome of Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1197, 1198, 1214 (1967). For a contrary
view, see Jack B. Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negligence Trials: An Example of the
Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L. REV. 831, 852–53 (1961). For an empirical
assessment, see Hans Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis,
76 HARV. L. REV. 1606 (1963).
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give an individual.90 Fifteen of our fifty cases involved a corporate or other
business party, and in eleven of them, the jury received this instruction. In
two of the cases involving a corporate defendant, a juror specifically
mentioned the instruction, referring correctly to the requirement that a
corporation or business be treated fairly. In others, although jurors did not
reference the instruction, they talked about the importance of treating the
corporation fairly. Yet any party in a case, including a corporation, may
have special duties that other parties do not have. For example, in a case
involving a manufacturer’s warranty, a juror used the admonition regarding
equal treatment of corporations to defend the corporation’s alleged
unwillingness to honor the warranty:
JUROR #3:

It says here on page nine that a corporation is entitled to the
same thing as an individual. If you went out and bought the
refrigerator from, you know, your buddy, John, and eleven
months later the motor went bad, do you, do you really think
that you should be able to go back to your buddy, John, and
say, “You know what? I’m not happy with this refrigerator
anymore. You have to give me my money back, you know,
because your motor, my motor went out.” I mean it’s a used
refrigerator, so . . . .

As the manufacturer of the product, the defendant in this case did have a
different obligation than John would have had, yet Juror #3 read the general
corporation instruction into the language describing the obligations of the
seller and was convinced that the instruction reduced the corporation’s
responsibility to the purchaser.
In another case in which a juror inaccurately combined unrelated
instructions, the jurors had to determine whether the behavior of the
defendant was “extreme and outrageous.” They were provided with this
definition: “Extreme and outrageous conduct is conduct that an average
member of the community would regard as atrocious and beyond all
possible bounds of decency.” As part of the damage instructions, the jurors
also received the so-called “eggshell plaintiff” instruction:
You must decide the full amount of money that will reasonably and fairly
compensate plaintiff for all damages caused by the fault of defendant, even if
plaintiff was more susceptible to injury than a normally healthy person would
have been, and even if a normally healthy person would not have suffered
similar injury.

90

For example:
A corporation is a party in this lawsuit. Corporations and individuals are entitled to the same
fair and impartial consideration and to justice reached by the same legal standards.
When I use the word “person” in these instructions, or when I use any personal pronoun
referring to a party, those instructions also apply to ______________.
RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Standard 11, at 26.
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Several jurors were confused when they tried to put the two instructions
together:
JUROR #9:

JUROR #4:
JUROR #6:

They define for us the “extreme and outrageous,” but then I
think it gets back to the 14b instructions [the eggshell plaintiff
instruction] which is also saying that you have to look at that
and say a normal person may not have been affected by that,
but this is not a normal, healthy person.
Right.
* * *
14b [the eggshell plaintiff instruction] may help decide
whether [defendant’s] actions were extreme or outrageous.

The distinction between the instructions is that one is designed to help the
jury determine liability by assessing whether the defendant intentionally or
recklessly caused emotional distress (i.e., plaintiff’s actions must be
extreme and outrageous as an objective standard), and the other should be
used by the jury in determining how much a plaintiff should receive for
damages (i.e., the eggshell plaintiff, who is more severely injured than the
average person, is entitled to recover more than the average person). The
instructions, however, provide the jury with little guidance in recognizing
this distinction. Moreover, by placing the definition of “extreme and
outrageous” on a separate page, rather than offering it as part of the
instructions on what the plaintiff had to prove to find the defendant liable, it
was easier for a juror to conclude that another part of the instructions
supplied the relevant definition.91 Perhaps surprisingly, most of the jurors in
this case ultimately focused on the appropriate standard for liability,
determining that even if the plaintiff was more susceptible to injury, the
behavior of the defendant did not meet the definition of “extreme and
outrageous.”
Cases involving multiple parties can pose a problem for the jurors who
must grapple with determining which instructions apply to each party. For
example, in a comparative fault case involving an automobile accident, the
jury had to decide whether the defendant was at fault for any of the injuries.
If so, the jury had to allocate fault between the two drivers. The jury had no
difficulty understanding the allocation of fault between the two drivers. The
problem arose because a second plaintiff was a passenger of the injured
driver and the jury found the defendant only partially at fault. As a result,
91

The claim instruction read:
Plaintiff claims that defendant intentionally or recklessly caused [him] [her] emotional distress.
To establish this claim, plaintiff must prove:
(1) Defendant’s action or inaction was extreme and outrageous;
(2) Defendant either intended to cause emotional distress or recklessly disregarded the near
certainty that such distress would result from [his] [her] [its] conduct; and
(3) Plaintiff sustained severe emotional distress as a result of a defendant’s conduct.
Id. Employment Law 16, at 211.
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the jury had to complete separate verdict forms for the driver and the
passenger in the plaintiff’s car. The jury was confused about whether the
same comparative fault percentages should apply to the plaintiff driver and
his passenger, or whether the plaintiff driver and passenger might have
different percentages of fault vis-à-vis the defendant. The jury ultimately
submitted a question to the judge who clarified that a single percentage was
to be applied to the two plaintiffs.
In another case, the jurors struggled to determine how to fit the
percentage of fault allocation with the total damages when the injury was
due in part to a preexisting problem. That is, the jurors were unclear as to
whether they should adjust the damage amount for the preexisting injury or
adjust the percentage of fault to account for the preexisting injury. The
instructions tell the jurors to decide total damages caused by the defendant’s
negligence and to allocate fault, but the instructions do not specifically
address the relationship to any preexisting injury. In this case, it took a
question to the judge to get an explicit explanation.
Other structural errors occurred when individual jurors attempted to
combine unrelated instructions. In one case, a juror assumed that a claim
and counterclaim—both of which involved allegations of intentional
interference—should somehow be related (after the jury reached a verdict
for the defendant on the initial claim, a juror asked, “But shouldn’t both of
them [the claim and the counterclaim] sort of correlate?”). The juror was
not corrected and the jury ultimately found in favor of the defendant on the
counterclaim. In another case, a juror concluded that liability should not be
found because he was not convinced the defendant had malice, applying the
“evil mind” state-of-mind instruction for punitive damages92 to the
underlying claim, which required only a showing of negligence.
Structural problems can also arise when the meaning of one instruction
depends on incorporating the meaning of another instruction. For example,
standard instructions tell jurors: “You will decide what the facts are from

92

This instruction stated:
If you find defendant liable to plaintiff, you may consider assessing additional damages to
punish defendant or to deter defendant and others from similar misconduct in the future. Such
damages are called “punitive” or “exemplary” damages.
To recover such damages, plaintiff has the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence, either direct or circumstantial, that defendant acted with an evil mind.
This required state of mind may be shown by any of the following:
(1) Intent to cause injury; or
(2) Wrongful conduct motivated by spite or ill will; or
(3) [Defendant acted to serve his own interests, having reason to know and consciously
disregarding a substantial risk that his conduct might significantly injure the rights of
others.]
[Defendant consciously pursued a course of conduct knowing that it created a substantial
risk of significant harm to others.]
Id. Personal Injury Damages 4, at 115 (footnote omitted).
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the evidence presented here in court.”93 Instructions may also—as in
Arizona—warn jurors not to speculate (“You must not speculate or guess
about any fact.”).94 A third instruction attempts to guide the jury’s judgment
on the credibility of witnesses (“In deciding the facts of this case, you
should consider what testimony to accept, and what to reject.”).95 Following
standard procedure, courts deliver these three admonitions at different
points in the presentation of the jury instructions, and this separation makes
it more likely that the jurors will consider one of the admonitions without
connecting it to the related instructions. For example, in one of the Arizona
trials, one party provided evidence on an important issue, while the
opposing party offered no evidence on that same issue. The jury had the
following exchange (the plaintiff claimed that the reconditioned item he
purchased from the defendant was defective):
JUROR #3:

JUROR #2:

I don’t think we’re supposed to speculate about [whether it was
fixed] because if they didn’t give any evidence to the contrary,
then we’re supposed to assume the evidence that, which we
got, shows that it was fixed. Because, you know, there was no
evidence—there’s evidence that it was fixed, there’s no
evidence that it wasn’t fixed. I mean, it didn’t work afterward,
but you could, you know, you know you could fix it and have
it break.
Yeah.

Thus, the jurors felt compelled by the jury instructions to accept the
evidence presented by one side. They focused on the admonitions that they
should confine themselves to the evidence and that they should not
speculate, but failed to recognize that the third related instruction, which
charged them with deciding whether or not to accept testimony that was
presented, could have properly led them to reject the presented evidence as
unconvincing. A similar misunderstanding apparently arose in the
Pennzoil–Texaco multibillion-dollar contract trial. James Shannon, a
member of the jury, recounted that in deciding on damages, the jury had
carefully followed Judge Casseb’s instructions to not consider anything not
represented by the evidence.96 According to Shannon, the jury accepted
Pennzoil’s $7.53 billion damage estimate because Texaco, arguing solely
against liability, had presented no evidence on damages.97
Jurors occasionally raised questions about the introduction of personal
experience into deliberations on similar grounds. Since they were instructed
to decide only on the basis of the evidence presented at trial, it was
93

Id. Preliminary 2, at 4; id. Standard 2, at 17.
Id. Preliminary 1, at 3; id. Standard 1, at 16 (“You should not speculate or guess about any
fact.”).
95
Id. Preliminary 4, at 6; id. Standard 6, at 21.
96
See JAMES SHANNON, TEXACO AND THE $10 BILLION JURY 476–77 (1988).
97
Id.
94
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therefore unclear whether their experiences outside of court could be
considered relevant. Yet jury instructions directly acknowledge that a chief
source of the jury’s value is the ability of its members to draw on their life
experiences, the jury’s so-called “common sense.” Thus, in Arizona, the
jury is instructed: “Consider all of the evidence in light of reason, common
sense, and experience.”98 But the jury is also warned: “You will decide what
the facts are from the evidence presented here in court.”99 The juxtaposition
of these two admonitions can lead to uncertainty. Some jurors who
conscientiously focused on the admonition to decide only on the evidence
were unsure whether or not their personal experiences as drivers or accident
victims could be discussed during deliberations. Clearly, that experience
could not be characterized as evidence, and it certainly was not produced in
court.100 At the same time, many jurors recognized that their prior
experiences could help them understand the evidence, and the instruction to
consider the evidence in light of their experiences appears to invite them to
do just that. Although the jurors generally handled this situation reasonably
(i.e., drawing on personal experience, but cutting off a juror who tried to
argue at length that his accident history should inform the group), some
further instruction on the use of personal experience in deliberations may
avoid the occasional conflict on this issue. Because jurors were explicitly
told in the instructions that they should consider the evidence in light of
experience, we did not consider their frequent use of personal experience to
be in error.
Finally, jurors are sometimes asked to consider the fault of a nonparty.
If the jury decides that the nonparty is partially responsible for causing the
damages and the party defendant is partially responsible, the jury can find
for the plaintiff and apportion fault between the defendant and the nonparty.
The defendant will then pay the portion of damages consistent with his
percentage of fault. If, however, the jury determines that the defendant is
not at fault, the jury cannot “award” damages to the plaintiff against the
nonparty. In one case, a jury faced with this situation struggled to
understand the relationship among the various verdict forms. Some of the
jurors did not immediately see why they could not complete the verdict
form in favor of the defendant, as well as the verdict form holding the
nonparty liable and awarding damages to the plaintiff. When the judge
confirmed that it was not possible, they found for the defendant.
In sum, these structural problems obstructed juror comprehension of
the instructions. When jurors are not supplied with the connective tissue
between, for example, multiple separate claims and the list of potential
damages relevant to each claim, they are left to puzzle over how to match
98

RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Preliminary 4, at 6; id. Standard 6, at 21.
Id. Preliminary 2, at 4; id. Standard 2, at 17.
100
The only mention of jurors’ prior experiences during formal court proceedings occurred during
voir dire.
99
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the claims with the appropriate damages. When two instructions use similar
language but relate to different concepts (e.g., how to treat a corporate
defendant in general as opposed to the special obligations a corporation
may have), failure to explicitly address the difference leaves room for
misunderstanding. Many of these structural problems that caused conflict
and confusion could have been avoided by showing the jurors how the
pieces of the instructions related to one another. Instead, the jurors
frequently spent substantial time struggling with connections that they
should not have made and trying to reconcile what appeared to be
inconsistencies that were in fact interlocking pieces that actually fit
together.
4. Omission Errors.—The third category of error is the omission
error. Omission errors arise because jurors bring expectations and
preconceptions to the jury box. They actively search for ways to make sense
of events about which they are told, consciously or unconsciously filling in
blanks and resolving ambiguities to produce a plausible account and arrive
at what they understand to be a just verdict consistent with the evidence and
instructions.101 Yet, despite this well-documented profile of the active juror,
jury instructions do not recognize—or at least do not address—the
possibility that jurors may find it necessary to fill in apparent gaps with
their own understanding of what is legally relevant. Instead, instructions
typically communicate with jurors on a “need-to-know” basis.102 The
traditional approach is to avoid bringing up an issue that the jury should not
be thinking about, in order to avoid the possibility that the instructions
would introduce an irrelevant topic that would otherwise not enter a juror’s
mind or be discussed during deliberations.103 This minimalist approach is
akin to the approach taken by the Federal Rules of Evidence in excluding
potentially prejudicial information that may inappropriately influence the
jury, such as subsequent remedial measures.104 Blindfolding through
exclusion may be a reasonable strategy when the blindfold is opaque, that
101

See, e.g., W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE
COURTROOM (1981); Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict
Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 557–58 (1992);
Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision Making: The Story Model,
13 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 519 (1991).
102
See, e.g., SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON MODEL UTAH JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL,
GUIDELINES FOR DRAFTING PLAIN-LANGUAGE JURY INSTRUCTIONS ¶ 16 (“Don’t instruct the jury about
things they don’t need to know, such as evidentiary rules.”), available at http://www.utcourts.gov/
committees/muji/guideline summary.pdf. This report was included in the materials used to draft the
Model Utah Jury Instructions, Second Edition, UTAH ST. CTS., http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/muji/
index.asp?page=civ&view=all_civ (last visited Sept. 7, 2012).
103
See Leon Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEX. L. REV. 157, 157 (1954).
104
E.g., FED. R. EVID. 407; see also Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Blindfolding the Jury, 52 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 247, 249–50, 261–64 (1989) (discussing the justifications for and effects of
“blindfolding” the jury as to certain information).
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is, when the jurors are unlikely to make assumptions about the potentially
prejudicial information.105 When personal experience and knowledge offer a
peek under the blindfold, however, the silent, exclusionary approach is
unlikely to be effective. The classic instance of such a topic is whether the
parties had insurance, a legally irrelevant issue in determining damages that,
as we show below, jurors in tort cases often spontaneously consider as they
discuss compensation.106
Other topics may be omitted from the jury instructions not through
intentional omission, but because the instructions do not adequately
anticipate all of the decisions that the jurors may face. For example, juries
in Arizona are told that they may reach a verdict if six of the eight jurors
agree and sign the verdict form.107 This leaves out a few details: What
should the jury do if six members agree that the defendant is liable? Who
deliberates on damages? Must the same six jurors agree on the damage
amount, or is the juror bound by the liability determination of the six? The
instructions are silent.
Table 5 shows the basic types of omission errors and reveals that fortyfour of the fifty cases produced juror comments that reflected topics
avoided—or at least not explicitly addressed—by the jury instructions. The
omission errors occurred as the jurors dealt with four major issues: (1) the
role of jurors who preferred a no-liability decision during deliberations on
damages; (2) the appropriate way to assess damages, including legally
acceptable sources and costs, appropriate goals, and the degree of the jury’s
discretion in arriving at an award; (3) the boundaries of relevant evidence;
and (4) procedural decisions the jury had to implement in reaching a
verdict. In each instance, the failure of the instructions to cover the topic
meant that during their deliberations, some jurors expressed an inaccurate
view of the relevant legal standard.

105

See Diamond et al., supra note 104, at 261–64; see also Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil
Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1905 (2001) (“When the
forbidden topic is unlikely to be raised spontaneously by the jury, it is an appropriate subject for
blindfolding.”).
106
See FED. R. EVID. 411 advisory committee’s note (“[K]nowledge of the presence or absence of
liability insurance would induce juries to decide cases on improper grounds.”); Michael v. Cole, 595
P.2d 995, 997–98 (Ariz. 1979) (en banc); 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 201 (Kenneth S. Broun ed.,
6th ed. 2006). See also 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A(2) (1979), which describes the
collateral source rule, which provides that “[p]ayments made to or benefits conferred on the injured
party from other sources are not credited against the tortfeasor’s liability, although they cover all or a
part of the harm for which the tortfeasor is liable.” The rule has been described as an “established
exception to the general rule that damages in negligence actions must be compensatory.” 25 C.J.S.
Damages § 172 (2002). For examples of juror comments on insurance, see infra Part IV.C.4.b.
107
See, e.g., RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Standard 15, at 30.
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TABLE 5: OMISSION ERRORS
Cases with
Errors

Percent
Corrected

Uncorrected
Errors

14
7

16.7%
46.1%
37.9%
52.3%
38.6%
90.7%
46.3%
72.7%

10 (1.5%)
631 (94.7%)
359 (53.9%)
241 (36.2%)
27 (4.1%)
4 (0.6%)
22 (3.3%)
3 (0.5%)

44

46.0%

666 (100.0%)

Type of Error

Total Errors

No-Liability
Jurors in Damage
Deliberations
Damages Issues
Source
Costs
Goals
Discretion
Relevance
Procedure

12 (1.0%)
1170 (94.8%)
578 (46.8%)
505 (40.9%)
44 (3.6%)
43 (3.5%)
41 (3.3%)
11 (0.9%)

2
43

1234 (100.0%)

Total

31
34
12
12

By far, the largest category involved damages, which accounted for 94.8%
of the omission errors. The primary sources of these damages errors were
comments about insurance and attorney’s fees.
a. No-liability jurors in damage deliberations.—In Arizona, as
in most other states, jurors in civil cases are not required to be unanimous in
order to reach a verdict.108 As a result, a juror may be outvoted by a majority
prepared to find the defendant liable. The law in Arizona is clear: every
juror who votes on liability should participate in the determination of other
issues, including damages.109 Thus, jurors in two of the Arizona cases made
errors when they expressed doubt as to whether a juror who had voted
against liability should participate in deliberations on damages. In the first
case, the issue was resolved with a question to the judge after the presiding
juror asked if the no-liability juror could go home while the rest of the jury
discussed damages.110 In the second case, the other jurors decided to permit
the juror to continue deliberating, although one juror was skeptical about
that decision. During the damages discussion, the exchange between these
108

See ARIZ. R. CIV. P. 49(a). Only eighteen states require unanimity in civil trials. Shari Seidman
Diamond et al., Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury,
100 NW. U. L. REV. 201, 203 (2006).
109
Perkins v. Komarnyckyj, 834 P.2d 1260, 1263 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc) (“[J]urors who find
themselves in a minority on one issue may not withdraw or be excluded from consideration of the other
issues in the case.”); accord Gorski v. J. C. Penney Co., 442 P.2d 851, 853–54 (Ariz. 1968); Hall v.
Delvat, 389 P.2d 692, 696 (Ariz. 1964). Arizona is not unusual in this position. See, e.g., Schabe v.
Hampton Bays Union Free Sch. Dist., 480 N.Y.S.2d 328, 335 (App. Div. 1984); Ralston v. Stump, 62
N.E.2d 293, 294‒95 (Ohio Ct. App. 1944); Tex. Gen. Indem. Co. v. Watson, 656 S.W.2d 612, 615 (Tex.
App. 1983).
110
In fact, the bailiff, and not the judge, accurately (albeit inappropriately) answered the question.
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two jurors became quite heated as the juror who had opposed liability
argued for a lower award and the previously skeptical juror attributed that
position to the juror’s earlier opposition to any award. In the end, the vote
of the juror who had opposed liability was not needed for the group to reach
a verdict and she did not sign the verdict form.
This issue of participation in damage discussions could only have
arisen in the six cases in which one or two jurors opposed a finding of
liability when the jury moved on to consider damages. Decisions on
liability and damages are legally independent so that once the jury has
determined that a defendant’s negligence caused some damage to the
plaintiff, the total amount of damages the plaintiff suffered should be
unaffected by the percentage of the defendant’s fault. Nonetheless, these
cases suggest some spillover from one decision to the other.111 We have just
described the two cases in which some members of the jury questioned the
continuing participation of the no-liability jurors. In the remaining four
cases, no juror raised a question about including all jurors in the
determination of damages. In all of these four cases, however, the jurors
who opposed liability argued for lower awards than at least some other
members who favored liability. In two of the cases, the jurors opposing
liability did not sign the verdict form. In the remaining two cases, a
unanimous verdict was reached with the no-liability jurors appearing to
succeed in limiting the award. It is unclear whether the deliberations were
affected by the lack of clarity about the appropriate role of no-liability
jurors in damage discussions, but ambiguity on this point is an unnecessary
product of the failure to instruct jurors on the legal standard that mandates
participation of all jurors at every stage of deliberations.
b. Damages.—The jury instructions in any civil case provide
jurors with a list of damage categories that the jury may consider if it
decides to make an award.112 Notably absent from the list is any mention of
how those damages will be paid, which is a practical concern for the parties,
but legally irrelevant to the jury’s charge of assessing reasonable damages

111

This spillover between liability and damages is sometimes referred to as fusion. See EDIE
GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, Characterizing Jury Damage Awards, in DETERMINING DAMAGES:
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JURY AWARDS 29, 41 (2003). Spillover from damages to liability judgments,
attributed to the hindsight bias, occurs when jurors use damage information to judge the likely
negligence of the defendant’s actions. See, e.g., Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex
Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995). The opposite path for
fusion, when liability judgments influence damage estimates, is less well-established. While some
studies have found that jurors consider defendant responsibility in calculating compensatory damages,
see, e.g., James K. Hammitt et al., Tort Standards and Jury Decisions, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 751, 756‒58
(1985), others have not, see, e.g., Corinne Cather et al., Plaintiff Injury and Defendant Reprehensibility:
Implications for Compensatory and Punitive Damage Awards, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189 (1996).
112
See RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Personal Injury Damages 1, at 112. See supra note 86 for
the full text of the instruction.
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without regard to who will pay.113 Similarly absent from the list are the
plaintiff’s costs of pursuing the lawsuit—including attorney’s fees, court
costs, and expert fees—which are also legally irrelevant, but nonetheless
have implications for the ability of the damage award to fully compensate
the plaintiff.114 The jury, or at least some of its members, is likely to
consider one or more of these topics in evaluating what fair compensation
will be. Currently, they do so without guidance from the court, unless the
jurors decide to ask the judge a question about insurance or about potential
costs, such as attorney’s fees or taxation of the award, a question the judge
does not always answer.115 But even if they do not ask such questions, jurors
come to the court with experiences that have primed them to think about
these topics.
(1) Source: insurance.—Jurors typically understand from
their own experience that many motorists and others are insured. As a
result, although jury instructions have traditionally avoided any mention of
insurance, jurors make assumptions about the likely insurance status of the
parties and draw conclusions about the likely behavior of the insurance
companies. These assumptions and conclusions vary depending on the
juror’s experience and knowledge of insurance. Consider the following
examples from three different cases:
CASE 1:
JUROR #8:

Well, insurance normally takes the tab on the car.

[And from the same jury]:
JUROR #1:

Insurance companies give you ten physical therapy treatments
at the most. Ten, twelve at the very most. And that’s what?
Maybe a month of treatment?

113

Evidence that a person carries liability insurance is generally excluded unless it is offered to
“prov[e] a witness’s bias or prejudice or prov[e] agency, ownership, or control.” FED. R. EVID. 411.
114
See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview,
1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 651.
115
Of the fifty-two questions that juries submitted to the judge during deliberations, eight
concerned insurance, three were about attorney’s fees, and six were about other costs. In response to
fifteen of these seventeen questions, the judge explicitly instructed the jury not to consider the issue. An
additional twenty-five questions on these topics were submitted during trial, twenty-three of them about
insurance. In response to ten of these questions, the judge explicitly instructed the jury not to consider
the issue and the judge gave no response at all to the remaining questions.
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CASE 2:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #6:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #3:

Um, we know it’s not going to come out of the defendant’s
pocket or there wouldn’t have been any, there wouldn’t have
been a trial.
[nodding] And he doesn’t have insurance, yeah.
There wouldn’t have been a trial.
Well, he might be liable for something over a certain amount.
CASE 3:

JUROR #5:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #4:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #7:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #7:
JUROR #2:

Was he on insurance, or was that out of pocket?
We don’t know.
Don’t know.
I was wondering, too.
I guess he was out of school and he was working part time
jobs, so he might not’ve been covered by anything.
Of course, he was young enough to be covered by his mom and
dad still—
Depending on what kind of insurance they had.
—up until twenty-one years.
And, he was living at home.

In Case 1, the jurors made claims about how insurance companies handle
accident expenses, and their claims were not contradicted. In Cases 2 and 3,
there was less agreement expressed by the jurors in the analysis of
insurance. In Case 2, Juror #2 claimed that the insurance company would
pay, but Juror #5 suggested that the defendant might have to pay something
as well. In Case 3, the jurors made very different assumptions about the
likelihood that the plaintiff had insurance. In thirty-one of the fifty cases,
the jurors erred by talking about the parties’ insurance, frequently
expressing the desire to avoid double-compensating a plaintiff who had
already been reimbursed through insurance. Note that unlike jurors who
made insurance comments that reflected resistance and a refusal to set aside
a topic the jurors were aware they should not consider, the jurors making
the insurance comments included in Table 5 gave no indication that they
knew the subject of insurance was legally irrelevant. This ignorance is
understandable. Unless a jury submitted a question to the judge concerning
whether insurance was to be considered—which occurred in eleven of the
cases116—the jury received no instruction that discussing insurance during
deliberation was inappropriate.117
116

In two additional cases the jury asked about insurance but did not receive a responsive answer.
Mention of insurance was a legally inaccurate reference unless: (1) a juror mentioned an
insurance company to identify where someone worked, (2) a juror drew on information presented at trial
about the reason for a plaintiff’s behavior in obtaining medical help or in the selection of a particular
doctor, or (3) a juror described personal experience with an accident and incidentally mentioned
insurance (e.g., after describing the accident in detail, the juror said, “And my insurance picked it up, so
117
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(2) Costs: attorney’s fees and other costs.—Jurors are
not only concerned with evaluating the source of the damage award. They
also know that litigants typically have expenses associated with the
litigation that may effectively modify the amount of an award. They are
usually aware that attorney’s fees in standard tort cases are contingency fees
that will come out of the plaintiff’s award. Discussion of attorney’s fees
occurred in thirty-four of the deliberations:
CASE 1:
JUROR #6:
JUROR #3:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #6:
JUROR #8:

All right. Here’s what you can do. You can come up with an
amount . . . say the [medical] bills. Let’s get the bills paid,
okay—
[interrupting] Well, but we’re just . . . we’re just doing in three
categories [of damages] right now [pointing to the board]. If
we all come up with other, we’ll work on that—
[at the same time as Juror #3] We’re just [pointing to the
board] . . . just doing three right now.
And add like 20% or whatever for attorney’s fees.
Okay, but we can do that . . . .
CASE 2:

JUROR #5:
JUROR #6:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #4:
JUROR #5:
JUROR #6:
JUROR #4:

Doesn’t some of that $[X] [go] for fees . . . for attorneys?
What about the attorney’s fees . . . .
The attorney’s—
They’ll come out of here.
He was acting like he [the plaintiff’s attorney] wasn’t going to
get paid.
No, no, no, no, wait. Attorney’s fees come off the top of that
$[X].
And that will be . . . the minimum will be 35%.

In Case 1, Juror #6 floated the idea of increasing the award to account for
attorney’s fees, which the jury did not explicitly follow. In Case 2, at least
three jurors engaged in a discussion of how much of the award will go for
attorney’s fees, although they did not explicitly adjust their award to cover
the fees. The only jury that explicitly added to its award to pay for
attorney’s fees was the jury described earlier that reasonably interpreted the
“services rendered” mentioned in the jury instructions on damages to
include attorney’s fees.118 More commonly, jurors did not see any language
in the instructions that told them how to deal with attorney’s fees, and the
topic peppered their discussions about damages, reflecting their
understanding of the fees as a significant cost that would effectively reduce
I didn’t go to court.”). These references occurred in eighty-six comments. In a further 195 comments, a
juror correctly and explicitly rejected insurance as relevant, usually in the context of correcting one of
the 578 comprehension and 259 resistance errors about insurance by another juror.
118
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff’s award. The majority (75%) of the 505 comments in the
category of cost errors concerned costs associated with attorney’s fees. In
the remaining 126 comments (25%), jurors in 12 cases raised concerns
about other irrelevant costs in addition to attorney’s fees that the plaintiff
incurred before and during the trial, such as costs for experts and time lost
from work while attending the trial. For example:
CASE 1:
JUROR #1:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #1:

Because court costs are probably pretty expensive.
Well, because of Dr. X and the consult with Dr. Y.
That’s probably two grand.
CASE 2:

JUROR #1:

They [the plaintiffs] would have been making money while
they were in the trial. They got, they lost [several] weeks.

In Case 2, the jurors explicitly added a modest amount to their award
(amounting to 1% of it) to cover the time the plaintiffs spent in court.
Jurors in eight cases expressed concern about whether the award would
be taxed. In one case the jurors explicitly reduced the amount they awarded
the plaintiff for lost wages, reasoning that if he had earned the lost wages
instead of recovering them at trial, he would have had to pay taxes on those
earnings:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #7:
JUROR #5:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #4:

What about taking taxes out of the wages? He wouldn’t have
gotten that money anyway.
Oh, should we make it net?
Yes, let’s make it net.
Well, you know, because all typically that he lost was what he
would have had to pay taxes on.
Right, right, absolutely.

Like the jurors’ concerns about insurance, these cost errors reflect the
jurors’ attention to items not mentioned in the instructions, but which jurors
see as part of their task as they try to appropriately compensate the plaintiff.
(3) Goals.—Jurors are instructed to fairly compensate the
plaintiff for the injury negligently caused by the defendant,119 but they are
not told that compensation is the only goal they should consider. They are
not told that both deterrence and punishment are inappropriate goals to
pursue. Without specific guidance limiting the only appropriate goal to
compensation in the ordinary negligence cases (in which punitive damages
are not at issue), jurors felt free to enlarge the range of goals they
considered. In twelve cases (24% of all cases), at least one juror expressed
an interest in “sending a message” or arriving at an award that would be “a
119
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wakeup call.” Both plaintiffs and defendants were the subject of these
comments:
CASE 1:
JUROR #6:
JUROR #3:
JUROR #6:

[W]e should also send a message that people can’t go around
suing just because—
Exactly.
—you get a little bumper.
CASE 2:

JUROR #4:
JUROR #3:
JUROR #4:

This is just to give a signal to the [defendant] that you have to
be reasonably, uh, accountable—
Mm-hmm.
—you know, to your public . . . people coming and going.

The remarks generally came from one or two jurors for a total of forty-four
comments across the twelve cases. Other jurors explicitly corrected some of
them (seventeen comments), as Juror #4 does below in a medical
malpractice case:
CASE 3:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #4:
JUROR #8:
JUROR #4:
JUROR #8:

On the other hand, you can look at this case as a way of
sending a message to Dr. X—
Mm-hmm.
—and the medical profession—
Exactly.
—that they need to—
Those are punitive damages.
—they need to watch—
And we’re not giving punitive damages.
—what they are doing.

Although Jurors #2 and #8 may not have been deterred from their goal by
Juror #4’s correction, they offered no further remarks on the topic during
the deliberation. Yet this count may underestimate the tendency for jurors
to see punishment as legitimate in a civil case in which it is not a legally
relevant consideration. There is some evidence that the reprehensibility of a
defendant’s behavior may increase awards.120 Thus, in the absence of an
explicit instruction that punishment is an inappropriate goal, jurors may be
more inclined to respond to irrelevancies, such as the defendant’s level of
reprehensibility.
(4) Discretion.—Deciding on damages is often described
as the most difficult task for jurors because so little guidance is provided

120

See GREENE & BORNSTEIN, supra note 111, at 136–37.
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aside from the instruction to award reasonable compensation.121 Faced with
plaintiff’s medical bills, jurors must determine what portion of these
expenses was “reasonable.”122 Even with claims for lost wages, the jury
must decide how much of the claimed amount the plaintiff actually would
have earned if she had not been injured by the defendant. That assessment
may require the jury to consider how many hours the plaintiff would have
worked and even the amount she would have earned during the missing
period (e.g., how much would she have earned as a commission-based
worker?). The challenge is even greater when the jury must estimate future
expenses—both medical expenses and any decreases in earning power or
capacity in the future. In addition to physical injuries, jurors may be asked
to consider damages for “pain, discomfort, suffering, disability,
disfigurement, and anxiety already experienced, and reasonably probable to
be experienced in the future as a result of the injury.”123 The plaintiff
typically provides evidence and specific dollar amounts requested for
medical expenses and lost earnings, past and future, often based on bills for
expenses accrued and expert medical and economic testimony. Without any
direct guidance from the court beyond the general instruction that what the
attorneys say is not evidence, jurors sometimes are unsure how to treat the
evidentiary guideposts124 the parties and their witnesses offer, and to know
when they have discretion to either ignore or adjust them:
CASE 1:
JUROR #3:
JUROR #8:

So the question is can we reduce the amount to Dr. X, or does
it have to be all or nothing? Right?
It has to be all or nothing.

These types of misunderstandings occurred in twelve cases. On a few
occasions, the jurors assumed there was a suggested range or guideline for
damages, and they turned to the judge for help, learning (from the judge’s
response) that it was up to them to determine the award. Nearly all of the
forty-three misunderstandings involving jury discretion (90.7%) were
corrected.

121

See RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Personal Injury Damages 1, at 112 (“If you find [any]
defendant liable to plaintiff, you must then decide the full amount of money that will reasonably and
fairly compensate plaintiff for each of the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to
have resulted from the fault of [any] [defendant] [party] [person] . . . .”); see also Edith Greene & Brian
Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury Instruction on Damage Awards, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L.
743, 746 (2000) (noting that jurors are instructed to compensate plaintiffs based on a number of
components such as pain and suffering, but are not provided with definitions of the terms or instructions
on balancing them).
122
RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Personal Injury Damages 1(3), at 112.
123
Id. Personal Injury Damages 1(2), at 112.
124
For a discussion of juror use of attorney recommendations as anchors, see Shari Seidman
Diamond et al., Damage Anchors on Real Juries, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 148 (2011).
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c. Relevant evidence.—Courts instruct jurors to base their
decisions on the evidence presented at trial and not to speak with trial
participants if they encounter them outside of court during the trial. Jurors
receive no explicit instruction about how they should handle any behavior
they may observe or hear in the courtroom apart from the evidence
presented from the witness stand or by the attorneys, or about what they
may see and hear inadvertently outside the courtroom. In view of current
legal controversy over whether a trier of fact should be permitted to
consider the observed behavior of a party who is present in the courtroom
while not testifying,125 we treated juror comments about “off-stage”
behavior126 as errors only when the comments referred to nontestifying
observers in the courtroom or to the behavior of trial participants outside
the courtroom, both of which were clearly legally irrelevant. Across three
cases, jurors made fourteen comments during deliberations about the
behavior of nontestifying observers in the courtroom (e.g., “Did you see the
man who was in the audience, sitting in the back who was with [the
plaintiffs] at lunch yesterday?”), and about chance opportunities to view the
behavior of the plaintiff outside the courtroom during the trial (e.g., “You
know, he [the plaintiff] walked off the elevator just fine.”). The majority of
the comments occurred in a case in which two jurors on separate occasions
discussed behaviors they saw outside the courtroom—in the bathroom and
on the street—where the plaintiff allegedly started limping when he
recognized the juror. As information obtained outside of the trial, the jurors
should not have mentioned those inadvertent observations during
deliberations. As we have suggested elsewhere,127 jurors used these “offstage” observations to support their positions, but there is little evidence
these observations affected verdicts in the cases in which they occurred.
Irrelevant evidence presented at trial in these civil cases, even if it drew
an objection sustained by the judge, was rarely substantially prejudicial to
one of the parties. As a result, few irrelevant items presented during the trial
attracted the attention of the jurors. In several instances, however, a juror
cited a legally irrelevant piece of information presented at trial (e.g., the
plaintiff “served our country” or has a family) as a basis for consideration
on issues other than credibility. Some of these suggestions were rejected as
irrelevant by other jurors, while others drew no reaction.
125

See, e.g., United States v. Schuler, 813 F.2d 978, 982 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that a witness’s
nontestifying demeanor is not a form of evidence and its use in closing argument is improper). But cf.
Morgan v. Dep’t of Fin. & Prof’l Regulation, 871 N.E.2d 178, 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (noting that an
ALJ did not err in taking note of the testifying defendant’s demeanor while sitting in the courtroom). See
also Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Offstage Behavior: Real Jurors’ Scrutiny of NonTestimonial Conduct, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 311 (2009) (discussing, in the context of proposals for fact
finders to view testimony on video instead of in person, fact finder use of “offstage” litigant behavior).
126
See Mary R. Rose et al., Goffman on the Jury: Real Jurors’ Attention to the “Offstage” of Trials,
34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 310, 313 (2010).
127
Id. at 313, 318‒19.
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d. Procedural errors.—Jurors receive some instruction on the
procedures that they are expected to follow during the trial (e.g., not to
speak with the attorneys, how to contact the bailiff for assistance, or not to
discuss the case with friends or relatives)128 and how to handle their
deliberations (e.g., choosing a foreperson to preside over deliberations),129
but the deliberations revealed several omissions in these instructions. In one
case, a juror worried that he was not supposed to take notes during closing
arguments. Some jurors in a second case were concerned that if the jury
decided two of the three claims and hung on the third, that the case would
have to be completely retried. In a third case, a juror wondered if the jury
was required to deliberate for a certain length of time. Most (72.7%) of
these errors were explicitly corrected, and the remainder were ignored.
They reveal that some standard procedures are unfamiliar to the laypersons
who serve as jurors, a fact which unnecessarily causes the jurors concern
and potentially distorts their behavior.
In sum, comprehension errors take a variety of forms. This intensive
analysis of when they occur and how juries do (and do not) address them
provides the groundwork for understanding the opportunities for improved
communication. In addition to these comprehension errors, however, we
also identified areas that may signal resistance rather than
miscomprehension. In the next section we discuss these “resistance” errors
expressed by jurors who appeared to misstate or misapply the relevant law,
not because they failed to understand an instruction, but because they
refused to follow it.
D. Resistance Errors
Resistance errors, in contrast to comprehension errors, occur when a
juror makes a legally inaccurate statement and there is explicit or contextual
evidence that the juror is aware that the statement is wrong. For a juror’s
error to qualify as a resistance error, the juror had to announce that he was
not following the law, or there had to be strong evidence that the particular
juror who made the error had received a clear instruction from the judge or
his fellow jurors on the accurate version of the law, yet the juror continued
to make the same error. That is, the 438 resistance errors, which constituted
one in six instruction errors, occurred when a juror did not follow the
appropriate legal standard and there was evidence that the juror was
deviating intentionally from the law. In contrast, if a juror, although wrong,
continued to maintain that he or she was correct, those inaccurate comments
were treated as comprehension errors rather than resistance errors. For
example, a juror did not want to attribute fault to the defendant from the
actions of the defendant’s agent even after the other jurors pointed out that
128
129
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the agency instruction indicated that the defendant had admitted the agency
relationship for purpose of the claims. The juror responded: “I’m not sure if
page ten [in the instructions] really means that [agent] is [defendant] in all
respects [involving the agent’s actions at issue in the case].” We did not
characterize this comment as resistance, although it is possible that the juror
was being disingenuous and strategic, because the juror expressed the view
that her position was correct, even suggesting that the jury send a question
to the judge to get clarification.130 As indicated below, to constitute a
resistance error a juror had to explicitly or implicitly reject an instruction,
and not claim that the correction of the juror’s error was itself wrong.131
A small number of the resistance errors were explicit and direct: the
juror announced that he or she was disregarding the law and discussing a
legally irrelevant topic or advancing an incorrect position on the law. Thus,
a juror was explicitly defiant when the juror said, “I know we’re not
supposed to speculate but . . . .” Other jurors showed similar awareness that
they were considering “forbidden topics.” For example:
CASE 1:
JUROR #6:

I probably shouldn’t say this at all, but here’s the part that
bothered me: this is why we all carry insurance. And we
obviously, one of his doctors said . . . she submits $[X] per
hour to his insurance carrier. Well, obviously we all know that
he probably didn’t pay, not for much of this, anyway.
CASE 2:

JUROR #3:

Now I know we’re not supposed to consider this, but you do
realize the attorney’s taking a lot of this.

In each of these instances of open defiance, the juror was directly
acknowledging the legal rule but continuing to maintain a course directly at
odds with it. These comments were made by twenty-four jurors who came
from twenty different cases, and there were only thirty-one explicitly
defiant comments overall.
A more common form of resistance occurred when jurors persisted in
making inaccurate comments about a legal issue after the judge clearly
answered a direct question about the point at issue or after several other
members of the jury explicitly pointed to a judicial instruction that
contradicted the juror’s erroneous claim about the law. The bulk of the
resistance comments, 308 (70%) of them, fell in this category. For example,
after the judge explicitly responded to a juror question about insurance by
telling the jurors to disregard the issue of insurance, a juror raised the

130

In this example, the juror was ultimately persuaded that the instruction justified an agency-based
liability, but this comment occurred during the deliberations before the juror reached that point.
131
For the reliability analysis of this coding, see supra note 66.
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question of the plaintiff’s insurance again and the following conversation
ensued:
JUROR #8:

JUROR #2:
JUROR #7:

If she [the plaintiff] had [] insurance, the chiropractor wouldn’t
be covered because she had a preexisting condition if that’s
what she’s suing for. But I don’t know, I don’t know how
many people have insurance. I mean, I can’t . . . .
Well her primary physician indicates that she must belong to
an HMO or, at the time have belonged to a group insurance.
At [plaintiff’s place of employment] they have good insurance.

Each of these three jurors showed resistance by disregarding the judge’s
explicit admonition. In other cases, the jurors pointed to a specific judicial
instruction (e.g., to ignore the plaintiff’s previous settlement for a worker’s
compensation claim or with one of the original defendants in the case) and a
juror continued to focus inaccurately on the topic.
The third category of resistance error involved persistent
nonacceptance of corrections from multiple jurors. Jurors made these
ninety-nine (23%) legally inaccurate comments after at least two other
jurors had corrected an inaccurate statement on this topic, thus implicitly
resisting the correctly expressed position after being confronted
unambiguously with it. For example:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #3:
JUROR #2:
JUROR #4:
JUROR #3:
JUROR #2:

Whatever comes out of this thing, her lawyer is going to
probably get anywhere from 25%–35%.
They get 33%.
Okay, her lawyer is going to get a third of whatever we tell
them. So, if in your mind . . . .
But see, now, the other thing is, if her lawyer is going to get
this, that shouldn’t be a factor into this. It’s her pain and
suffering. She can deal with this.
You’re not supposed to think about what the lawyer gets.
But still, you have to keep that in the back of your mind.

Here, Juror #2 persists with the issue of attorney’s fees after Juror #4 and
Juror #3 admonish the juror that it is inappropriate to consider the topic.
These comments provided the weakest evidence of resistance. After all, the
other jurors, unlike the judge issuing a direct and clear admonition, could be
wrong.
It may be that a few of what we called resistance errors in fact reflected
such a serious misunderstanding of the instruction that the juror making—
and persisting in making—the error simply did not understand or notice the
correction. We suspect, however, that there were few of these instances.
When a juror did not explicitly announce that she was resisting, we only
coded the error as a resistance error if it occurred following a very clear
sign from the judge or other jurors that that the juror was making an error.
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The vast majority of the 438 resistance comments concerned insurance
(58.2%) or attorney’s fees (26.9%).132 In these comments, the jurors,
contrary to legal doctrine,133 expressed the view that both insurance and fees
are appropriate considerations despite the legal irrelevancy of both in
determining damages. In articulating that view, the jurors thus expressed a
modest disagreement with governing law, while accepting the overarching
legal principle that a compensatory award should attempt to place plaintiffs
as nearly as possible to their pre-accident or dispute positions.
Apart from insurance and attorney’s fees, only a few other topics
revealed jurors’ willingness to nullify the law, but they generally related
similarly to the question of the sources or expenses that would affect full
compensation. In a few remaining cases, individual jurors wanted to enlarge
the category of relevant information in other ways. For example, in one case
a juror insisted that it would be appropriate to find out whether one of the
parties received a citation in the accident to determine who was at fault. In
another case, the juror explicitly resisted the judge’s clear communication
that a fact the jury found relevant was not relevant at all: “They [the judge]
said it was irrelevant, but to me it was relevant as far as what kind of person
he is: Do his children talk to him . . . ?”
Two important points emerge from this analysis of the resistance
errors. First, they are relatively infrequent compared to the much larger set
of comprehension errors. Second, resistance errors tend to focus on
insurance and attorney’s fees, where the law rules out consideration of these
factors that jurors nonetheless find relevant to producing an appropriate
compensatory award.
E. Sustained Objections
Jurors receive the bulk of their instructions on the law at the end of the
trial, but they are warned in preliminary instructions that the judge will also
make legal rulings during the course of the trial. The jurors are told in
advance that when an objection is raised by one of the parties and the judge
either sustains that objection or explicitly tells the jurors that a question or
answer should be stricken from the record, the jurors should disregard that
question, exhibit, or testimony.134 To evaluate how the jurors responded to
132

An additional 0.9% concerned both.
See sources cited supra note 106.
134
The preliminary instruction from Arizona stated:
If an objection to a question is sustained, you must disregard the question and you must not
guess what the answer to the question might have been. If an exhibit is offered into evidence and
an objection to it is sustained, you must not consider that exhibit as evidence. If testimony is
ordered stricken from the record, you must not consider that testimony for any purpose.
Do not concern yourselves with the reasons for my rulings on the admission of evidence. Do
not regard those rulings as any indication from me of the credibility or weight you should give to
any evidence that has been admitted.
RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Preliminary 3, at 5.
133
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these sustained objections as a form of jury instruction, we sampled thirteen
cases135 and examined each of the sustained objections in situations: (1) that
might have involved disclosure of information to the jury that the judge’s
instruction would have demanded that the jury not consider,136 (2) that
garnered from the judge a specific admonition to strike, or (3) in which no
reason was given by the attorney or judge. These criteria produced 234
objections, which constituted two-thirds of the sustained objections in these
cases.137 We examined each of the objections and the information revealed
in the objectionable question or answer to determine whether any new
information was revealed that under the governing law, the jury should not
consider. We also checked to see whether the same information was
revealed in unobjectionable questioning in another part of the trial. We then
scrutinized the deliberation transcript to see whether the jurors discussed
the objectionable material, and, if so, what they said.
The majority of the sustained objections (79%) did not reveal any new
or distinctive information. In these cases, either the objection prevented the
witness from, for example, giving hearsay evidence, or the attorney was
able to rephrase the question to avoid making it objectionable. The witness
who answered the rephrased question, perhaps cued by the leading
question, then provided the desired answer in an unobjectionable form.
Objections to lack of foundation were typically addressed by providing a
foundation, so that the question was then permitted. In other cases, another
source provided the same information that the sustained objection had
barred.
In thirty-five of the instances, the sustained objection did reveal new
information, but the jurors did not discuss the objectionable material. In the
remaining fourteen instances, the jurors did talk about the topic that was the
subject of the sustained objection. In two of these fourteen instances, the
new information apparently had no influence, as when an attorney in a
leading question on redirect suggested a legitimate reason for the failure of
the witness to produce some financial records, drawing an immediate
sustained objection. The jury unanimously rejected the credibility of the
suggestion and, in fact, the credibility of the witness on all financial
matters. Thus, only 12 of the 234 instances in this sample of sustained
objections generated unique information that might have influenced the
135

We selected these thirteen cases to proportionally represent the range of case types (five motor
vehicle, one medical malpractice, six other tort, one contract) and frequency of objections from the cases
in our sample, and also because we had trial transcripts for eleven of these cases. We identified the
objections and rulings on the objections in the remaining two trials from the videotapes of those trials,
rather than the transcripts. We then examined the deliberations in all thirteen cases.
136
For example: argumentative, assumes facts not in evidence, counsel is testifying, lack of
foundation, hearsay, lack of personal knowledge, leading, misstates evidence, irrelevant, speculation,
prejudicial.
137
Thus, we did not include sustained objections such as “asked and answered” because they were
not based on objectionable information that had been or threatened to be revealed to the jury.
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jury. In two of these remaining twelve instances, both from the same case,
we were able to trace juror talk during deliberations directly to the material
brought out that led to the sustained objection. In the discussions involving
these two objections, the jurors explicitly referred to the fact that the
sustained objection had occurred. Their conversation involved two
objections made during the testimony of the same witness, as the
questioning attorney attempted to introduce hearsay evidence that others at
the scene had made the same identification that the testifying witness had
made. When Juror #2 brought up the corroborating “witness” support
during deliberations, two other jurors immediately responded:
JUROR #1:
JUROR #3:

How come [the absent witnesses] didn’t come and testify?
Wasn’t that deemed hearsay and stricken from the record
though? Wasn’t it deemed that we couldn’t use that because it
was all hearsay?

Juror #2, who originally raised the issue, tried to defend his position: “In
other words, we’re going to call [the absent witness] a liar?” Juror #6 joined
the conversation, responding: “No, we’re not calling [the absent witness] a
liar. We, we don’t have any testimony from [the absent witnesses]. How
can you call them a liar? They haven’t testified. We have hearsay.
Somebody said.” Although Juror #2 persisted in wanting to give weight to
the absent nonwitness, the majority of the jurors explicitly rejected that
view.
The jurors did not explicitly talk about any other objection, and in no
instance other than the one discussed above could their talk be traced
directly to the forbidden material. In most of the other instances, sources
other than the objectionable material may have produced the discussion
(e.g., an objection was sustained because the attorney suggested a
motivation and the jurors discussed that motivation, but the facts of the case
would have suggested that motivation even if the attorney had not asked the
question). There is no doubt that the deliberations only partially reveal what
affects jury verdicts, and the material that emerged from the remaining
twelve objectionable questions or answers may well have influenced the
juries’ decisions. Nonetheless, this analysis provides no evidence that jurors
regularly misused information revealed in spite of a sustained objection.
What explains this minimal evidence of influential forbidden intrusions
associated with sustained objections? The answer may stem from system
controls on the attorneys, which are sometimes underappreciated. The
classic version of influential intrusion that draws a sustained objection but
is likely nonetheless to influence the juror appears in criminal trials when
the prosecutor’s question produces evidence of the defendant’s criminal
record (and the defendant has not taken the stand). The analogue in the civil
case occurs when an attorney mentions or extracts information on
insurance. What prevents attorneys from eliciting such potentially
influential testimony beyond the fact that it may draw an objection that will
1591
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be sustained? One reason is that it may draw a damaging response from the
judge. For example, it may influence discretionary rulings138 or lead to more
direct action. In one of our cases, the judge responded when a plaintiff’s
attorney asked a question involving insurance by instructing the jury that
the defendant did not in fact have insurance.139 Further, in an extreme case,
failing to abide by evidentiary rules can result in a mistrial, as it did in the
initial trial of baseball legend Roger Clemens, in which the prosecution left
a videotape running during a sidebar, but while the jury was present, that
showed hearsay congressional testimony supporting the credibility of a key
prosecution witness.140 It may also present fertile grounds for an appeal
based on the claim that the inadmissible evidence tainted the jury.141
Attorneys are generally urged to keep objections to a minimum, even
when an objection would be legally warranted, out of concern that the
objection itself will draw attention to the objectionable question or
testimony.142 This advice not to take the chance of emphasizing
objectionable questions or testimony has some empirical support143 and may
reduce the frequency of objections, even when they are legally warranted.
As we have seen, when objections did occur in these trials, the rulings on
them were typically brief and gave little time for the jury to focus on the
unanswered question or the partially interrupted response until the moment
had passed. Moreover, the questions and responses that produced most
sustained objections revealed little potentially prejudicial information to
these juries.
The result of this confluence of forces is that, unlike the Hollywood
version of a trial in which an attorney asks a question that dramatically
138

Our thanks to Professor Robert Burns for this observation. Interview with Robert Burns,
Professor of Law, Nw. Univ. Sch. of Law (Mar. 10, 2012).
139
In another trial not included in the thirteen sampled for the detailed analysis discussed in this
section, a similar event occurred, and the defense attorney requested a mistrial. The judge responded by
immediately giving an instruction in which he reminded the jurors that the plaintiff had mentioned that
the defendants may have had insurance and instructed them to ignore that testimony. The jurors in this
case did talk about insurance, the majority of their references contradicting the judge’s instruction. The
primary contested issue in the case was how much damage, if any, was caused by the accident. The
jurors were skeptical about the extent of the injury, and it is unclear whether the jury discussion of
insurance affected the modest award.
140
Richard A. Serrano, Clemens Trial Gets Quick Hook: Jury Is Allowed to View Statements on a
Witness’ Credibility, Leading to a Mistrial, L.A. TIMES, July 15, 2011, at C1.
141
See Edward J. Imwinkelried, Poetic Justice in Punishing the Evidentiary Misdeed of Knowingly
Proffering Inadmissible Evidence, 7 INT’L COMMENT. ON EVIDENCE 1, 1‒2 (2009), available at http://
www.degruyter.com/view/j/ice.2009.7.1/ice.2009.7.1.1089/ice.2009.7.1.1089.xml?format=INT.
142
Cf. THOMAS A. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 336 (3d ed. 1992) (“Unless
you are reasonably sure that the answer to a question will hurt your case, it is usually better not to
object.”).
143
See Nancy Steblay et al., The Impact on Juror Verdicts of Judicial Instruction to Disregard
Inadmissible Evidence: A Meta-Analysis, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 486‒87 (2006) (“[The]
[o]verruling of an objection is likely to accentuate the importance of that evidence and its impact.”).
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reveals damning inadmissible evidence and opposing counsel immediately
and loudly objects, these ordinary civil trials rarely extracted potentially
influential prejudicial evidence highlighted by objections. Moreover, our
close study of the deliberations in the wake of sustained objections showed
no evidence suggesting that jurors resisted the judicial admonitions that
were offered in this context. In the end, instructions on the law delivered by
the judge through sustained objections did not appear to influence jury
deliberations.
F. Consequences of Comprehension and Resistance Errors
All comprehension and resistance errors conflict with the legal
system’s obligation to adequately instruct juries and the jury’s legal duty to
follow the law. Although jurors made remarkably few errors in talking
about the law during these deliberations, we identified seven cases in which
a general misunderstanding on the part of the jury explicitly affected the
jury’s damage award and no case in which resistance explicitly influenced a
verdict on either liability or damages. The first damage award influenced by
jury error was the result of a language error, two awards were influenced by
omission errors, and four awards were affected by the same structural error.
In the first case, the misunderstanding arose from a palpable failure to
communicate: not only did the jurors not understand that the phrase in the
instructions “services rendered” referred only to medical services (and not
to attorney services), but in addition, the legal system failed to provide them
with reasonable assistance; in response to their question, they received no
clarification from the judge, who simply redirected them to the page listing
damage categories that they had already been trying to follow. In two other
cases, jurors made modest adjustments in their awards based on legally
irrelevant criteria that were not mentioned in the jury instructions. In one
case, the jury raised an award to account for the time the plaintiffs spent in
court, and in the other, the jury reduced an award for lost wages to account
for the taxes the plaintiff would have had to pay had he worked to earn the
money. In all three of these cases, an explicit instruction ruling out
attorney’s fees, taxes, and time in court as considerations in determining
damages would have corrected any misunderstanding as to what the law
prescribes. Of course, a clearer instruction may not have deterred the jurors
from adjusting their awards to consider these factors, but in the absence of
such an instruction, it is a mistake to attribute lack of compliance to
misbehavior by the jury.144
144

In 10 other cases, some jurors understood that attorney’s fees were an illegitimate factor to
consider but nonetheless persisted in discussing how the attorney’s fees would affect what the plaintiff
recovered. In 3 of those cases, a majority of the jurors participated in the conversation, producing a total
of 102 resistance errors. In all 3 cases, they bemoaned the fact that an undeserving plaintiff’s attorney
might recover more than he deserved. A total of 20 resistance comments occurred across the remaining
7 cases. In none of these 10 cases was it clear that the attorney’s fees influenced the damage award.

1593

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

The structural errors that arose in four other cases shaped the damages
the jury awarded when the jurors adjusted their awards in comparative fault
cases to ensure that the plaintiff would recover reasonable medical costs.
These juries gave no indication that they saw this approach as inconsistent
with the legal instruction to allocate the percentage of total damages
between the two parties on the basis of percentage of fault. No juror on any
of these juries objected to the way the jury arrived at the percentage of fault
or the assessment of damages. Here, further work is needed to determine
how, and perhaps whether, to address these structural errors. It is significant
that in one of the four cases, the decision to give full medical expenses
despite allocating partial fault to the plaintiff was in part a compromise
between a few jurors, who wanted to make an award for pain and suffering,
and the majority, who objected to any award for pain and suffering.
The history of comparative damages is instructive on the conflicts
about the appropriate relationship between decisions on liability and
damages. Before comparative fault emerged as the dominant legal regime
for torts, some legal scholars advocated the use of bifurcated trials that
would separate considerations of liability and damages.145 The comparative
fault cases add an additional context in which questions about the ability to
separate liability and damage considerations emerge.146 When juries fail to
keep liability and damage assessments separate, it may reflect
comprehension problems. Alternatively, or in addition, the jurors in these
cases may be revealing a preferred theory of damages that the law as
currently constructed does not recognize: that injured plaintiffs should be
entitled to recover some of the costs associated with injuries received that
were caused by the negligence of a defendant (e.g., medical expenses, but
not pain and suffering), even if the plaintiff contributed to the injuries as
well. In any event, the deliberations of these juries suggest that instructions
under the current legal rules have only inconsistently led jurors to separate
considerations of liability and damages in comparative fault cases.
V. ADDRESSING LEGAL ERRORS
Most of the juror talk about legal issues that we observed during these
deliberations showed the jurors grappling successfully with their jury
instructions—79% of comments stating or applying the law accurately
reflected the instructions and less than 9% of the comments about
instructions were errors that remained uncorrected. This close examination
of error in deliberations suggests that jury instructions are largely, although
not always, successful in helping jurors understand what they need to know
about the law they are being asked to apply. The results show far better
performance than what is typically reported in surveys and in the
145
146
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experimental literature.147 What explains this inconsistency? One possibility
is that jurors faced with applying instructions during deliberations are able
to assist one another in ways not captured on post-deliberation questions or
in studies of individual respondents. Another possibility is that the
availability of written copies of the instructions for each individual juror
bolsters comprehension. As we saw, the Arizona jurors frequently consulted
their written instructions to directly check their understanding of the legal
standards they were being asked to apply.148 In some prior research showing
no effects of deliberation on post-deliberation comprehension measures, the
jurors did not receive even one copy of the instructions.149
Finally, we might ask whether the jurors in Tucson were unusually
competent. As other researchers have shown, comprehension of complex
evidence increases with juror education.150 In fact, the educational
distribution of the Tucson jurors in the Arizona Jury Project was
remarkably similar to the distribution of jurors in a study conducted in a
large urban state court in Cook County, Illinois, and in a second study
conducted in a federal court in Connecticut151:
TABLE 6: EDUCATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF JURORS

Less than 4 years of high school
High school graduate
Some college
College degree or greater

AJP
Jurors
(venire)
(n=353)
4.5%
22.7%
40.2%
32.6%

Cook County
Jurors
(venire)
(n=1022)
6%
24%
28%
41%

Connecticut Jurors
(venire)
(n=1801)
3.9%
20.7%
28.4%
47.0%

(jurors)
(n=426)
3.8%
23.5%
26.8%
46.0%

In light of this evidence that the Arizona jurors are not atypically highly
educated and that the report card from these real jury deliberations shows
far better marks than the prior empirical work would have predicted, we
might be tempted to dismiss the concerns frequently raised about opaque
jury instructions152 and ignorant jurors.153 Nonetheless, the jurors we studied
147

See supra notes 19–21.
See supra notes 56–57 and accompanying text.
149
See, e.g., Ellsworth, supra note 21.
150
See Valerie P. Hans et al., Science in the Jury Box: Jurors’ Comprehension of Mitochondrial
DNA Evidence, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 60, 67 (2011).
151
See Diamond & Casper, supra note 101, at 529 n.15; Hillel Y. Levin & John W. Emerson, Is
There a Bias Against Education in the Jury Selection Process?, 38 CONN. L. REV. 325, 336–38 (2006).
152
E.g., Ellsworth & Reifman, supra note 6, at 540.
153
E.g., FRANKLIN STRIER, RECONSTRUCTING JUSTICE: AN AGENDA FOR TRIAL REFORM 140
(1994).
148
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did not always succeed in understanding and correctly applying their
instructions on the law, and we found evidence that the errors affected
damage awards in several cases. Moreover, because we could only listen to
the jurors talk and could not hear their unexpressed errors in thinking, our
ability to learn about their misunderstandings may be incomplete. In
addition, it was clear that the jurors often had to struggle to arrive at an
accurate understanding of the law they were supposed to apply. Both their
struggles and the public perception of a disconnection between jury
decisionmaking and the law threaten the legitimacy of the jury as a
trustworthy pillar of the justice system. Finally, although the trials we
studied here are typical standard fare in state civil litigation, the instructions
the jurors in these cases received were not nearly as complex as the
instructions jurors face in some trials. For example, in a recent case in
Illinois, former governor Rod Blagojevich was charged with twenty-four
counts involving alleged attempted bribery, attempted extortion, and wire
fraud, among other charges.154 At the end of the trial, the jury received more
than one hundred pages of instructions, and the jurors reported that they
spent the first several days of deliberations attempting to understand the
instructions, including the relationship between the various charges.155
Although this trial was more complicated than the trials in the Arizona
Project and indeed involved an unusually complicated set of charges, the
Arizona jurors who faced cases involving multiple claims were also
challenged by the need to understand whether there was a relationship
between them.
Our sense is that the Arizona jurors in the ordinary set of civil trials we
studied provide a window into the problems that jurors face more generally,
revealing previously undiagnosed sources of error. Although the
deliberations display generally effective performance by the jurors, the
deliberations also reveal struggles and errors reflecting strains that need to
be addressed. We begin the next section by embracing fully the goal of
optimizing compliance with the current legal standards that jury instructions
attempt to convey. Thus, we focus on potential remedies for
miscommunication. At the end, however, we step back and consider the
jury as a source rather than as a recipient of law, describing some ways that
legal rules might change to reflect jury preferences not recognized in
current legal doctrine.

154

Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, For Blagojevich, a Guilty Verdict on 1 of 24 Counts, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2010, at A1.
155
Monica Davey & Susan Saulny, Jurors Fault Complexity of the Blagojevich Trial, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 19, 2010, at A1 (“It was like, ‘Here’s a manual, go fly the space shuttle,’ Steve Wlodek, one of the
jurors, said . . . .”). After the first jury hung on all but one of the twenty-four counts, Blagojevich was
retried on seventeen of the charges and the second jury reached a unanimous verdict on fifteen of them.
Monica Davey & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Ex-Governor Found Guilty of Corruption: In Second Trial,
Jurors Convict Blagojevich, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2011, at A1.
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A. An Overview of Potential Remedies
If we instructed jurors using plain English whenever possible and
defined unfamiliar legal terms when use of those terms was unavoidable,
the instruction process could eliminate many of the missteps associated
with technical jargon and could remove up to one in four of the errors made
by jurors in the Arizona Project. These linguistic problems are welldocumented and can be corrected, if not effortlessly, then at least with a
modicum of effort. Some efforts have recently been made in this
direction.156 Indeed, Arizona’s pattern jury instructions have been revised to
encourage courts to replace the descriptions “plaintiff” and “defendant”
with the names of the parties in order to avoid juror confusion.157 The errors
that opaque instruction language causes do not stem from any inherent
inability of the jury, from inconsistencies in the law, or from active
resistance to legal directives, but merely from curable communication
failures. But these wording traps are not the only, or even the most
fundamental, reason why jurors may struggle unsuccessfully as they
attempt conscientiously to apply the law. The Arizona jury deliberations
revealed two more challenging sources of a serious disconnect with the
law—as written—that a plain English focus will not solve. The following
two other sources account for three out of four instruction errors: first,
structural errors arising from the piecemeal construction of jury
instructions, and second, omission errors arising from an unwillingness to
confront the realities about what jurors know and expect. Together with the
evidence of a few pockets of active resistance to the law, these other
sources of error reveal why more is required than a plain English movement
in jury instructions if the goal is both to provide clear guidance and to
generate compliance. They also reveal the law’s inconsistencies and
ambivalences, suggesting the possibility that jurors—and not legal
doctrine—may occasionally have the better of the argument when the two
are at odds.

156

See Peter M. Tiersma, Communicating with Juries: How to Draft More Understandable
Instructions, 10 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 1 (2006) (proposing basic rules for effective communication
with jurors). The author, Peter Tiersma, is a linguist who recently helped rewrite the California Pattern
Jury Instructions. Id. at 2. For examples of empirical studies demonstrating that plain English revisions
to jury instructions can improve comprehension, see Diamond & Levi, supra note 33; V. Gordon Rose
& James R.P. Ogloff, Evaluating the Comprehensibility of Jury Instructions: A Method and an Example,
25 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409, 419–20 (2001) (finding comparable results using a different experimental
design); and see also Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First Century,
81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 486–87 (2006) (advocating having former jurors serve on pattern jury
instruction committees).
157
This change might have eliminated the sixteen technical language errors that jurors made in
three of our cases due to confusion about the identity of parties mentioned in the instructions. See
discussion supra Part IV.C.2.b.
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B. Addressing Structural Errors
Jury instructions are written in parts.158 When the court delivers the set
of approved instructions, each part has been vetted for legal accuracy by the
judge and the parties, but the set as a whole typically has been put together
like a patchwork quilt with pieces from the defense, pieces from the
plaintiff, and pieces from the judge. The jury receives the result and then
tries to fit the pieces together. Although each instruction may be intelligible
on its own, the jury is given little or no advice on how the pieces should
work together. How could we ensure that jurors understand how the
instructions fit together? The only way would be for the authors of jury
instructions to analyze and evaluate sources of potential conflict between
pieces, attend to the order in which they are to be presented, and offer the
jury explicit guidance on the relationship or non-relationship between the
two parts of the instructions. Many of these changes would not require
drastic action. They might, for example, involve embedding a definition
within the instruction, rather than presenting the definition by itself on a
separate page. Other changes would require more; for example, instructions
might be included that explicitly point out differences between instructions
that might appear to be related. This more holistic approach to writing
instructions, whether by a pattern jury instructions committee or by the
attorneys and trial judge in the case being tried, means that the instructions
are not ready when all of the relevant pieces are selected, but only after the
sum of the parts is considered as a whole.
An additional byproduct of this holistic approach is that it would in
some cases reveal inconsistencies in the law that are worthy of attention,
identifying instances when instructions are not clear because the legal
doctrine itself is ambiguous. For example, how far is a juror permitted to go
in drawing on personal experience, as jurors regularly do? What if the juror
has relevant occupational expertise? As one juror with medical expertise
observed:

158
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That’s another thing, one of the things I was listening really
carefully . . . they didn’t say . . . . They said two things that
kind of confused me. They said you can’t use any evidence that
wasn’t introduced.
Right.
Now I can sit here and think a lot about the reasons she would
have a lot of the symptomatology she does . . . that they never
said, ‘What about this? What about this [counts on fingers] you
know.’ Now, can we consider those things?

We did not consider this musing to be an error. Jurisdictions differ in their
evaluation of what would be permissible in this case.159 Even judges and
experienced attorneys in the same jurisdiction have varying views on the
appropriate use of such juror expertise. We have presented vignettes to
judges and experienced attorneys, describing, for example, a juror with a
medical background who convinced her fellow jurors in a tort suit that the
medical expert who testified for the plaintiff was incorrect.160 The expert
claimed that the plaintiff’s injury made him more susceptible to the viral
infection he contracted six months after the accident.161 We asked judges
and practicing attorneys whether the juror had behaved appropriately or
inappropriately. Even judges from the same jurisdiction were divided on the
propriety of the juror’s behavior. The issue here is thus not merely a matter
of clarifying what the law demands, but rather of determining what that
demand is.
C. Addressing Omission Errors
Omission errors should come as no surprise once we correct the
misleading picture of jurors as blank slates and acknowledge that they do,
as they must, fill in gaps to make sense of what they see and hear in the
courtroom.162 All comprehension is inherently a constructive process, and
we regularly rely on our prior experiences to enable us to understand and
interpret what is left unspecified. Often, we arrive at an accurate
understanding that is generally shared. For example, we understand the
sentence, “The policeman held up his hand and stopped the car.”163 We
159

See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Embedded Experts on Real Juries (Feb. 8, 2012)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with the authors).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Cognitive psychologists refer to cognitive structures of organized prior knowledge, abstracted
from experience with specific instances, as cognitive schemas. They can be acquired directly or
indirectly, and they guide both the processing of new information and the retrieval of stored information.
See, e.g., SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION (2d ed. 1991).
163
This classic example comes from Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror
Decision Making, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192, 195 (Reid
Hastie ed., 1993).
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easily infer from our prior knowledge about police and traffic that the
officer signaled the driver to come to a stop and did not put his hand on the
car to forcefully prevent it from moving. Other inferences are more
difficult, vary across individuals, and may fill gaps with unintended or
inaccurate content. Our findings demonstrate that litigation expenses and
insurance are in this category.
Jurors in personal injury cases in Arizona are instructed:
If you find [any] defendant liable to plaintiff, you must then decide the full
amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate plaintiff for each
of the following elements of damages proved by the evidence to have resulted
from the fault of [any] [defendant] [party] [person]:
(1) The nature, extent, and duration of the injury.
(2) The pain, discomfort, suffering, disability, disfigurement, and anxiety
already experienced, and reasonably probable to be experienced in the
future as a result of the injury.
(3) Reasonable expenses of the necessary medical care, treatment, and
services rendered, and reasonably probable to be incurred in the future.
(4) Lost earnings to date, and any decrease in earning power or capacity in
the future.
(5) Loss of love, care, affection, companionship, and other pleasures of the
[marital][family] relationship.164

In all of the thirty-two Arizona cases in which the jurors found in favor
of the plaintiff, the jurors referred to this list as they deliberated on
damages. They generally addressed each category, although they were
sometimes unclear what the category “nature, extent, and duration of the
injury” covered, and they primarily focused on damage elements two
through five (e.g., medical expenses, lost earnings). In addition, however,
jurors often expressed the view that this approach would be incomplete in
determining the appropriate compensation. In trying to reasonably and
fairly compensate the plaintiff, the jurors recognized that other factors
would influence what the plaintiff received, including insurance, attorney’s
fees, and occasionally taxes.165 Currently, the legal system generally deals

164

RAJI (CIVIL) 3d, supra note 55, Personal Injury Damages 1, at 112. The instruction calls for a
modification of this list to avoid elements that are inapplicable (e.g., future expenses if none are
claimed) or cumulative, and notes that some unlisted elements may be applicable and that therefore
customization may be required. Id. No additional elements were added to any of the personal injury
instructions for cases in the Arizona Project. A sixth element—“Loss of enjoyment of life, that is, the
participation in life’s activities to the quality and extent normally enjoyed before the injury.”—was
added to the list since the Arizona Project data were collected. STATE BAR OF ARIZ., REVISED ARIZONA
JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CIVIL) 108 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter RAJI (CIVIL) 4TH]. No jury in the Arizona
Project received this additional instruction.
165
Jurors, in effectively enlarging the legally relevant criteria supporting a damages award, reflect a
distinction that attorneys make in discussing settlement values: both the jurors and the attorneys are
concerned with “new money”—that is, with what the plaintiff will actually receive. Tom Baker, Blood
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with these unlisted factors simply by ignoring them because they are all
legally irrelevant. If the legal system really intends to have jurors ignore
these factors,166 it seems clear that failing to speak to the jurors about them
is a failing strategy. Although it is difficult to trace juror comments on these
topics directly to case outcomes in all instances, juries in at least three cases
adjusted their awards to reflect items not on the list of relevant damage
categories. In other cases, individual jurors said they were increasing their
award to cover attorney’s fees or decreasing their award on the assumption
that the plaintiff had already recovered some or all expenses from
insurance. The topics of insurance and attorney’s fees come up so
frequently during deliberations that a more direct approach is required.167
We cannot escape, so we should not ignore, the fact that modern jurors are
aware of the realities of litigation costs and sources of reimbursement.168 By
leaving these topics unaddressed, we effectively invite the unwarranted
disparity in decisions that can arise as some juries adjust their awards to
reflect these elements and others do not. Even if we are hesitant to address
each potential litigant cost or source of reimbursement separately, on the
grounds that most juries do not consider some of them (e.g., taxes or
witness costs), a meta-instruction could warn jurors that if any item does
not appear on the list they receive from the judge, the jurors should not
include it in any award they make.
D. Addressing Resistance Errors
Juries are sometimes criticized for refusing to follow the law they are
given, yet we saw little evidence of explicit resistance.169 It may be that
when jurors intentionally nullify the law, they do so primarily in criminal
cases, or that they express their resistance silently. A juror, for example,
might not believe that a defendant was negligent but may decide that the
defendant should pay the plaintiff’s damages for some other reason. Aware
that the law requires negligence, such a juror might not overtly
acknowledge that he was ignoring the negligence requirement. The
deliberations did reveal a few complaints about the strictures of the law by
an occasional juror who voiced some dissatisfaction with having to follow

Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 301‒02
(2001).
166
Fifty years ago, Harry Kalven, Jr. suggested that the legal system might actually be ambivalent
about jury considerations of attorney’s fees: “Since we cannot decide what we want to do about fees as
damages, we are happy to let the whole troublesome issue go to the jury.” Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity
of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1070 (1964).
167
Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, at 1907 (“Ignoring [jurors’] attention to the [forbidden]
issue[s] is tantamount to behaving like an ostrich.”).
168
See discussion supra Parts IV.C.4.b(1)–(2).
169
See supra Part IV.D.
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it. For example, several jurors expressed discomfort with the vicarious
liability arising from agency law. Here, Juror #3 explains:
I don’t think that’s right, but it’s the law. It’s just like the sexual harassment
thing. If your supervisor sexually harasses you, you can sue the company even
though it was the guy, and it wasn’t the company, that was groping you, you
know, it was the guy. But the company’s still liable and it’s the law, and it
probably isn’t good, right, or fair but we have to follow what the law says.

Insurance played a key role as a source of both resistance and
comprehension errors, presenting the dilemma of how to address the
insurance issue if comprehension is not the primary source of
noncompliance for at least some jurors. The current legal practice of silence
on the subject, or willingness to address it only when jurors explicitly ask a
question about it, simply promotes inconsistency and undermines fairness.
We have previously suggested that one remedy might be to explicitly
instruct jurors in tort cases, when they are highly likely to assume that
insurance is present, that insurance is legally irrelevant.170 We also
advocated honestly telling them that there is no way they can accurately
determine whether any party in the case has insurance coverage or, if one or
both parties have it, how much insurance they have.171 Research is needed to
determine whether this kind of acknowledged blindfolding can operate as a
reasoned admonition,172 that is, as a “collaborative instruction.”173 A
collaborative instruction treats jurors as partners in the enforcement of legal
rules by including a reason-based explanation as to why a statute or other
legal standard addressed a particular issue the way it did. This reasoned
admonition goes beyond a simple admonition that merely demands that the
jury accept a legal standard without further justification because it is the
law.174 The notion is that if jurors are persuaded to accept the explanation,
170

See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, at 1909‒10.
Id.
172
See, e.g., Diamond & Casper, supra note 101, at 524. “The traditional remedy for the
introduction of inadmissible evidence is to admonish the jury to ignore it.” Diamond & Vidmar, supra
note 105, at 1907.
173
See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, at 1911.
Arizona and several other states have recently introduced an instruction on the irrelevance of
insurance, but none has given an explanation for the admonition to disregard beyond the bald assertion
that insurance is not relevant; for example, “In reaching your verdict, you should not consider [or
discuss] whether a party was or was not covered by insurance. Insurance or the lack of insurance has no
bearing on whether or not a party was at fault, or the damages, if any, a party has suffered.” RAJI
(CIVIL) 4TH, supra note 164, Standard 9, at 30 (citing Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, as a source,
but modifying the instruction proposed in that article). Moreover, use of the instruction is generally
discretionary: “Arizona Superior Court judges have differing views as to whether to use the insurance
instruction just situationally or routinely.” Id. use note. Other states with instructions containing similar
admonitions include California, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, CACI
No. 105, at 15 (2012), Indiana, IND. JUDGES ASS’N, INDIANA MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No.
533 (2011), and Virginia, 1 VIRGINIA MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL No. 9.015, at I-191 (1998).
174
See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, at 1909.
171
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they will be more inclined—and better able—to set aside an issue that they
initially find pertinent. We do not presume that such explanation-based
instructions can control the use of evidence that appears not only useful, but
central to answering key questions about witness credibility (e.g., criminal
record),175 but for more peripheral issues, particularly those like insurance
coverage that are likely to be the subject of general interest from jurors and
are susceptible to widely varying assumptions, a direct explanation-based
instruction may offer the most effective approach.
Even more challenging is the resistance that emerges from juror
awareness that the plaintiff will have to pay attorney’s fees. The evidence
presented here of the ubiquitous nature of this concern, and the
reasonableness of jurors’ sense that full compensation should cover the
plaintiff’s costs in litigation, breathes new life into the arguments against
the general application of the American rule that requires parties to bear
their own litigation costs.176 Although there has been much debate about the
relative merits of the American rule versus the English rule (which has the
loser pay the winning party’s litigation costs, including attorney’s fees),177
the potential impact on unwarranted disparity in jury awards has received
little attention.
E. Human Limits on Applying Legal Rules
The errors we observed in these deliberations arose primarily because
the instructions failed to tell the jurors what they needed to know. We
expected to see, but did not find evidence of, another source of error that
experimental studies have documented: the tendency of the law to on
occasion ask jurors (and judges) to perform impossible mental gymnastics

175

There is ample evidence that people may be unable to suppress thoughts even when they are
highly motivated to do so and that unconscious or uncontrollable mental processing can influence
judgments. See, e.g., Daniel M. Wegner, Ironic Processes of Mental Control, 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 34, 34
(1994); Timothy D. Wilson & Nancy Brekke, Mental Contamination and Mental Correction: Unwanted
Influences on Judgments and Evaluations, 116 PSYCHOL. BULL. 117, 117 (1994). Thus, both laypersons
and judges may be influenced by inadmissible evidence they recognize as irrelevant and are motivated
to disregard. See, e.g., Saul M. Kassin & Samuel R. Sommers, Inadmissible Testimony, Instructions to
Disregard, and the Jury: Substantive Versus Procedural Considerations, 23 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1046, 1047‒49 (1997) (laypersons); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore
Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251,
1288‒1324 (2005).
176
For discussions of the current rule and the controversy surrounding it, see Howard Greenberger,
The Cost of Justice: An American Problem, An English Solution, 9 VILL. L. REV. 400 (1964), and John
F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to Justice,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567 (1993).
177
E.g., John J. Donohue III, Commentary, Opting for the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell
Can’t Remember the Coase Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991); Keith N. Hylton, Fee
Shifting and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 427 (1995).
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that do not comport with human abilities.178 For example, there is
convincing evidence that jurors cannot limit their use of a defendant’s
criminal record, as the law requires, to judging credibility and not to
influencing judgments of propensity.179 Yet courts regularly give a limiting
instruction to do just that. Similarly, the Supreme Court in State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell held that juries, when setting
the amount of punitive damages, should be told that they can consider outof-state conduct by the defendant to judge the defendant’s reprehensibility,
but not to set the amount of damages based on harm done to such
nonparties.180 The rationale may be understandable, but using the evidence
of injury to others appropriately probably demands superhuman capabilities
that judges as well as jurors lack.181
We have little doubt that limiting instructions impose demands that are
likely to be difficult for jurors—and possibly judges182—to apply as the law
directs. In those circumstances in which the legal rule asks for the
application of a limiting instruction, solutions that will ensure that the
legally mandated rule will be applied are also limited. As we and others
have suggested elsewhere, admonitions, limiting or not, may be insufficient
to eliminate the influence of evidence that a decisionmaker sees as highly
relevant to arriving at an accurate verdict.183 Limiting instructions further
tax the juror’s ability to follow the court’s direction by asking the juror to
engage in the cognitively complex task of using information for some
purposes but not for others (e.g., using a criminal record as an indicator of
credibility but not propensity).184 In the case of evidence that falls into this
178

See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 666 (2001) (“In general, limiting instructions
have proven to be ineffective and have even been associated with a paradoxical increase in the targeted
behavior.”).
179
See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When
Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 43 (1985); see
also Theodore Eisenberg & Valerie P. Hans, Taking a Stand on Taking the Stand: The Effect of a Prior
Criminal Record on the Decision to Testify and on Trial Outcomes, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1353 (2009)
(finding a statistically significant impact of a prior criminal record on the likelihood of conviction,
especially in cases with weak overall evidence).
180
538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
181
Justice Ginsburg discussed the difficulty in making this distinction in her dissent in Philip
Morris USA v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346, 362 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
182
We know of no study that has tested judicial reactions to limiting instructions, but there is
evidence that judges do in fact show the human tendency to use information they are aware they should
disregard. See, e.g., Wistrich et al., supra note 175, at 1323‒24.
183
See Diamond & Vidmar, supra note 105, at 1914; Samuel R. Gross, Make-Believe: The Rules
Excluding Evidence of Character and Liability Insurance, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 859–60 (1998);
Kassin & Sommers, supra note 175, at 1047‒49.
184
Joel D. Lieberman & Jamie Arndt, Understanding the Limits of Limiting Instructions: Social
Psychological Explanations for the Failures of Instructions to Disregard Pretrial Publicity and Other
Inadmissible Evidence, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 677, 685 (2000) (pretrial publicity); see also
Devine et al., supra note 178, at 666.
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single-use category, the only realistic way to prevent the decisionmaker
from using the information for impermissible purposes would be to bar the
evidence entirely.
It is worth noting that limiting instructions may be relatively rare in the
typical civil case. We saw such limiting instructions in only two of our
cases, both of which involved plaintiffs with criminal records. In designing
a remedy for misuse of limiting instructions, it would first be valuable to
know when and how often they are used.
VI. CONCLUSIONS, CHALLENGES, AND RADICAL REFORM
The conventional wisdom on jury comprehension of legal instructions
is only partially correct: juries do struggle with jury instructions, and they
sometimes misapply legal rules in reaching their verdicts.185 With some
important exceptions, however, the deliberations of the Arizona jurors as
they discussed legal issues were remarkably consistent with the instructions
they received. Moreover, the evidence presented here shows that
deliberations do assist in resolving individual misunderstandings. The jurors
in Arizona, armed with individual copies of the jury instructions, were able
to correct nearly half of the errors made during their deliberations.
Nonetheless, a substantial portion of the struggle jurors go through in
attempting to apply unnecessarily convoluted and ambiguously worded
instructions is preventable. The push to improve the clarity of jury
instructions is well-justified. But it is not enough if we are serious about
having jurors apply the law.
Other procedures, typically within the judge’s discretion but not widely
used and used in just a few of the Arizona cases, may also improve
comprehension. For example, the judge may give substantive legal
instructions at the beginning of the trial that can assist jurors by giving them
a preview of the legal issues they will be asked to deal with.186 Similarly, by
giving final legal instructions before closing arguments, the judge can
provide the complete legal framework so that the attorneys can then refer to
the legal instructions that the jurors have already heard from the judge, and
the jurors can then place those arguments in the appropriate legal context.
Yet, as we have seen, the more challenging obstacles to optimal jury
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We note, however, that application of the law by judges in state civil bench trials, at least in the
eyes of appellate courts, shows an imperfect record: a 27.5% reversal rate (the reversal rate for jury trials
is 33.7%). Theodore Eisenberg & Michael Heise, Plaintiphobia in State Courts? An Empirical Study of
State Court Trials on Appeal, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 121, 130 (2009).
186
E.g., Amiram Elwork et al., Juridic Decisions: In Ignorance of the Law or in Light of It?, 1 LAW
& HUM. BEHAV. 163, 172 (1977); Saxton, supra note 20, at 112; Vicki L. Smith, Impact of Pretrial
Instruction on Jurors’ Information Processing and Decision Making, 76 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 220
(1991); see AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 29, at princ. 6.C.1, at 29 (“The court should give preliminary
instructions directly following empanelment of the jury that explain . . . the basic relevant legal
principles, including the elements of the charges and claims and definitions of unfamiliar legal terms.”).
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performance in dealing with the law arise in those areas of
“misunderstanding” that stem not merely from heavy legalese or poor
sentence structure, but from deeper structural issues and failures to confront
inconsistencies and ambiguities in the law. The Arizona deliberations,
although generally showing sensible decisionmaking by citizens motivated
to “get it right,” reveal tensions arising from some fundamental gaps
between what we tell jurors to do and what we want them to do, coupled
with limitations on what we can reasonably expect from any human
decisionmaker, whether judge or jury. Even a wholesale conversion to plain
English instructions would not eliminate these tensions. The honest
assessment is that we can do better than to supply juries with a “kettleful of
law.”187 We can add structures that guide them in using an unfamiliar recipe,
rather than simply tossing a set of ingredients in a pot. We can conduct
empirical tests to gauge whether the ingredients and seasonings are
blending well.188 We can directly tell jurors to avoid ingredients that will
spoil the stew. Those improvements will take more work, but they can be
made.
If we are really serious about educating trial jurors about the law they
are to apply, we could take an even more radical step: recognizing that
instruction is more effective when it is not one-sided. Modern courts are
increasingly permitting jurors to submit questions for witnesses during trial.
The questions are vetted by the judge with advice from the attorneys before
the witness is permitted to answer them. The evidence is that the
opportunity to submit questions offers useful assistance to jurors.189 When it
comes to jury instructions on the law, however, the only point at which a
jury can submit a question is after their deliberations begin. As in other
states,190 in all of the Arizona Jury Project cases, the bailiff informed the
jury at the beginning of deliberations that if they had a question, they
should write it down, have the foreperson sign it, and ring for the bailiff,
who would then deliver the question to the judge. That means that the jurors
must confer and submit any question they may have on the law to the bailiff
or marshal. The judge then must contact the attorneys, who are not likely to
have remained in the courtroom, to discuss the answer the jury will
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See BOK, supra note 2 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Diamond & Levi, supra note 33.
189
See SEC v. Koenig, 557 F.3d 736, 741‒43 (7th Cir. 2009); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror
Questions During Trial: A Window into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1927, 1942‒44 (2006)
(providing an empirical evaluation of the practice).
190
See, e.g., MICH. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 1 MICHIGAN
MODEL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 60.01, at 60-5 to -6 (2002 & Supp. 2011) [hereinafter MICH.
MODEL CIVIL INSTRUCTIONS], available at courts.mi.gov/mcji/MCJI.htm; Bailiff Orientation—
Interaction with Jurors, WASH. COURTS, http://www.courts.wa.gov/training/global_printversion/Bailiff_
PrintVersion.htm#manjurdurdel (last visited Sept. 4, 2012) (including instructions for bailiffs on how to
manage jurors during deliberation).
188
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receive.191 The jurors learn quickly that they cannot receive an immediate
response to a question they submit during deliberations.192 This may
discourage questions, and it hardly facilitates understanding. An alternative
would be to read the instructions in the courtroom, providing each juror
with a copy as the instructions are read, and immediately to take any
questions a juror has at that point. As with questions for witnesses, such
questions should be submitted in writing, and as with questions submitted
during deliberations, the judge should consult with the attorneys before
responding. Of course, some questions may emerge only as deliberations
unfold, but others may be clear from the start. Judges might prefer to avoid
taking the chance they may give a legally inaccurate answer that will
become an argument on appeal, as can happen with a legally inaccurate
response to a question submitted during deliberations, but the benefit is that
misunderstandings can be corrected that would otherwise follow the jury
into the deliberation room.
A final option for responding to some of the inconsistencies we have
observed between legal standards and juror preferences is even more
radical: we can use what we have learned from the jury’s discomfort (and
modest resistance) in applying aspects of the law to reconsider what the law
should be. The historical record on the jury’s potential role here is
instructive. Early juries deciding felony cases reportedly often refused to
convict because so many felonies (i.e., approximately 230 capital felonies
in the early nineteenth century, up from about 50 a century earlier) were
punishable by death, a sentence that seemed unduly harsh in many of these
cases.193 The unwillingness of jurors to convict offenders guilty of these less
serious offenses that were punishable only by death reportedly led to
elimination of the death penalty for those offenses.194
In the twentieth century, the jury played a role in modifying legal
doctrine in civil cases. The traditional law of contributory negligence barred
plaintiffs from any recovery if the plaintiff bore any responsibility for his
injury. Jurors allegedly refused to apply this rule strictly, awarding damages
even when the plaintiff was partially at fault and leading the way to the
modern comparative negligence approach that recognizes divided
responsibility.195 Perhaps it is time to listen to the jury again in assessing the
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See, e.g., MICH. MODEL CIVIL INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 190.
See VICTOR VILLASEÑOR, JURY: THE PEOPLE VS. JUAN CORONA (1997), for an extreme instance
of the discouragement jurors felt in waiting to have a question answered. The jurors in the Arizona Jury
Project waited up to forty-nine minutes for a response (the mean was nineteen minutes; the median was
twenty minutes).
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See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 24, at 310‒11.
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Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 87,
113‒14.
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role that insurance and litigation costs should play in compensating injured
plaintiffs.
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